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Abstract 
 
Carbon capture and storage is the process of capturing waste CO2 from large point sources, 
such as large fossil fuel power plants, transporting it to a storage site, and deposing it where it 
will not enter the atmosphere, normally an underground geologic formation. The aim of this 
study is to individuate the most critical processes concerning CCS plants in order to support the 
optimization of the known best practices in this field, in particular of the capture ones. The 
starting point has been the research, in the chemical plants history, of all the industrial accidents 
happened until today. Obviously in the investigation has not been reported CCS accidents since 
it is a new technology, not yet so widespread, evidently for the general barely capacity to sustain 
the costs for this pollution reduction technique. Thus, a collection of all the substances involved 
in the capture phase has been used to guide the research. Results have demonstrated that the 
capture process with MEA was potentially the most hazardous one, since the damages that could 
occur with that, would be huge. After that an Aspen Plus simulation has been run on an existing 
pilot plant to identify the most critical part of the plant: it will be verified to be the stripping 
section. In this part of the plant has been concentrated the attention: initially a hazard and 
operability study has been written about that section and after that, a fault tree and event tree 
analysis has been performed, with the choice of a release as Top event. So, first has been done 
some qualitative considerations and afterwards also the quantitative ones have been evaluated. 
To conclude the risk assessment, a software simulation on Aloha platform has been run to study 
all the possible consequences that a release of that type of substance can cause: different 
conditions has been hypothesized to include all the possible scenarios. 
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Introduction 
 
Nowadays it is becoming more and more evident that the rapid increase of the world population, 
the unchecked industrialization of the second world countries and the continue increase of 
energy demand of the world in general, it is increasing the presence of greenhouse gases in our 
atmosphere. In particular, the electric energy production is for the main part carried out with 
the combustion of fossil fuels, e.g. carbon and methane: this obviously creates some by-
products and, between them, there is the carbon dioxide, one of the greenhouse gases that 
continue to fuel the global warming. Apart from the unknown effective availability of fossil 
fuels, their employment in the future can probably continue only if the CO2 produced does not 
reach the atmosphere and keeps staying in. For this reason, the Carbon Capture and Storage 
technology, namely the capture of the carbon dioxide and its subsequently injection in the 
underground, is a solution that can satisfy both the fossil fuel utilization and the global warming 
reduction. In this thesis, a study on the capture section of a CCS plant is carried out using the 
tools, in general, provided by the risk analysis. The objective of this work is the identification 
of critical processes in CCS chains to support the advancement of best practices. Specifically, 
it is considered only what concerning the capture part of the process. For this purpose, this 
thesis starts from the study of all the dangerous substances that might be present in a carbon 
capture plant to identify the most hazardous process and consequently to improve the best 
practices in order to obtain a safer process. After the individuation of that, with a historical 
analysis of the industrial accidents involving all the substances that can be used for carbon 
capture, the work proceeds with a simulation of the ordinary operation of that process. 
Thereafter, alterations of the conditions are induced on a hypothetically flue gas exiting from a 
combustion power plant, to observe what is the “precarious” section of the capture. In the fifth 
section of this work the focus is on that section and an accurate risk analysis is performed, 
through its more common tools, i.e. Hazop, FTA and ETA, in order to evaluate the occurrence 
frequency of a flammable and toxic release and subsequently to provide all the countermeasures 
need to contrast it. Moreover, a simulation of consequent scenarios which may occur is also 
performed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 1 
Carbon Capture and Storage 
Global-warming and climate change concerns have triggered global efforts to reduce the 
concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2). 
Different approaches are considered and adopted by various countries to reduce their CO2 
emissions, including: 
- Improve energy efficiency and promote energy conservation; 
- Increase usage of low carbon fuels, including natural gas, hydrogen or nuclear power; 
- Deploy renewable energy, such as solar, wind, hydropower and bioenergy; 
- Apply geoengineering approaches, e.g. afforestation and reforestation; 
- CO2 capture and storage. 
The application areas, advantages and limitations of these different approaches are compared 
in the Table 1.1. Some of these approaches deal with source emissions reduction, such as 
adopting clean fuels, clean coal technologies, while others adopt demand-side management, i.e. 
energy conservation. Each approach has intrinsic advantages and limitations that will condition 
its applicability. It is unlikely that adopting a single approach or strategy can adequately meet 
the IPCC goal of CO2 reduction, i.e. 50–85% by 2050 from 2000 levels, and therefore, a 
complimentary portfolio of CO2 emission reduction strategies needs to be developed [1]. 
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Table 1.1. Summary of CO2 reduction strategies 
Strategy Application 
area/sector 
Advantages Limitations 
Enhance energy 
efficiency and 
energy 
conservation 
Applied mainly in 
commercial and 
industrial buildings. 
Energy saving from 10% 
to 20% easily achievable. 
May involve extensive capital 
investment for installation of energy 
saving device. 
Increase usage 
of clean fuels 
Substitution of coal by 
natural gas for power 
generation. 
Natural gas emits 40–50% 
less CO2 than coal due to 
its lower carbon content 
and higher combustion 
efficiency; cleaner exhaust 
gas (lower particulates and 
sulfur dioxide emissions). 
Higher fuel cost for conventional 
natural gas. Comparable cost for 
shale gas. 
Adopt clean coal 
technologies 
Integrated gasification 
combined cycle 
(IGCC), pressurized 
fluidized bed 
combustor (PFBC) etc. 
to replace conventional 
combustion. 
Allow the use of coal with 
lower emissions of air 
pollutants. 
Significant investment needed to 
roll out technologies widely. 
Use of 
renewable 
energy 
Hydro, solar (thermal), 
wind power, and 
biofuels highly 
developed. 
Use of local natural 
resources; no or low 
greenhouse and toxic gas 
emissions. 
Applicability may depend on local 
resources availability and cost. 
Power from solar, wind, marine etc. 
are intermittent and associated 
technologies are not mature; most 
current renewable energies are more 
costly than conventional energy. 
Development of 
nuclear power 
Nuclear fission 
adopted mainly in US, 
France, Japan, Russia 
and China. Nuclear 
fusion still in research 
and development 
phase. 
No air pollutant and 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Usage is controversial; development 
of world's nuclear power is hindered 
due to the Fukushima Nuclear 
Accident in 2011, e.g. Germany will 
phase out all its nuclear power by 
2022. 
Afforestation 
and 
reforestation 
Applicable to all 
countries. 
Simple approach to create 
natural and sustainable 
CO2 sinks. 
Restricts/prevents land use for other 
applications. 
Carbon capture 
and storage 
Applicable tolargeCO2 
point emission 
sources. 
It can reduce vast amount 
of CO2 with capture 
efficiency >80%. 
CCS full chain technologies not 
proven at full commercial scale. 
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1.1 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
Amongst that different approaches, CCS can reduce CO2 emissions (typically 85–90%) from 
large point emission sources, such as power production utilities, and energy intensive emitters, 
e.g. cement kiln plants. In this approach, CO2 is first captured from the flue/fuel gases, separated 
from the sorbent, transported and then either stored permanently or reutilized industrially. CCS 
includes a portfolio of technologies, involving different processes for CO2 capture, separation, 
transport, storage and monitoring that will be discussed later [1]. CO2 is formed during 
combustion and the type of combustion process directly affects the choice of an appropriate 
CO2 removal process. CO2 capture technologies are available in the market but are costly in 
general, and contribute to around 70–80% of the total cost of a full CCS system including 
capture, transport and storage [2]. Therefore, significant R&D efforts are focused on the 
reduction of operating costs and energy penalty. There are three main CO2 capture systems 
associated with different combustion processes, namely, post-combustion, pre-combustion and 
oxyfuel combustion. These three technologies are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
1.1.1 Post-combustion 
This process removes CO2 from the flue gas after combustion has taken place, as can be seen 
in the Figure 1.1. Post-combustion technologies are the preferred option for retrofitting existing 
power plants. The technology has been proven at small-scale with CO2 recovered at rates up to 
800 ton/day [3]. However, the major challenge for post-combustion CO2 capture is its large 
parasitic load.  
Figure 1.1. Post-combustion process scheme 
Since the CO2 level in combustion flue gas is normally quite low (i.e.7–14% for coal-fired and 
as low as 4% for gas-fired), the energy penalty and associated costs for the capture unit to reach 
the concentration of CO2 (above 95.5%) needed for transport and storage are elevated [4]. The 
U.S. National Energy Technology Laboratory estimated that CO2 post-combustion capture 
would increase the cost of electricity production by 70% [5]. A recent study reported that the 
cost of electricity would increase by 32% and 65% for post-combustion in gas and coal-fired 
plants, respectively [6]. It has been identified that 16 large scale integrated CCS projects are 
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currently operating or under construction but two of them are of post-combustion technology 
[7]. 
1.1.2 Pre-combustion 
In this process, the fuel (normally coal or natural gas) is pre-treated before combustion. For 
coal, the pretreatment involves a gasification process conducted in a gasifier under low oxygen 
level forming a syngas which consists mainly of CO and H2, and is mainly free from other 
pollutant gases (Eq. 1.1). The syngas will then undergo water gas shift reaction with steam 
forming more H2 while the CO gas will be converted to CO2 (Eq. 1.2): 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
→         𝐶𝑂 + 𝐻2                                                                                                            (1.1) 
 
𝐶𝑂 + 𝐻2𝑂
𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟−𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡
→            𝐻2 + 𝐶𝑂2                                                                                            (1.2) 
 
𝐶𝐻4 + 𝐻2𝑂
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚
→     𝐶𝑂 + 𝐻2                                                                                                             (1.3) 
 
The high CO2 concentration (>20%) in the H2/CO2 fuel gas mixture facilitates the CO2 
separation [4] (typical CO2 separation methods will be discussed afterward). Subsequently, the 
H2 is burned in air producing mainly N2 and water vapor. Pre-combustion capture can be applied 
to Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) power plants using coal as fuel, but this will 
incur an efficiency loss of 7–8% [3,8]. EPRI and USDOE have developed a roadmap of IGCC 
technology developments that can potentially improve the IGCC efficiency matching or 
exceeding the current IGCC technology without capture [8]. Natural gas, as it mainly contains 
CH4, can be reformed to syngas containing H2 and CO (Eq. 1.3). The content of H2 can be 
increased by the water gas shift reaction (Eq. 1.2) and the rest of the process is similar to that 
described above for coal [9]. A performance and cost analysis were conducted on advanced 
combined cycle gas turbine plants operated by natural gas with a pre-combustion CO2 capture 
system and obtained a CO2 capture efficiency of 80% with the cost of CO2 avoided reaching 
$29/ton CO2 for an advanced design concept [10]. A schematic process flow diagram of a 
hypothetic pre-combustion process can be seen in the Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2. Pre-combustion process scheme 
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1.1.3 Oxyfuel combustion 
In oxyfuel combustion, oxygen, instead of air, is used for combustion. This reduces the amount 
of nitrogen present in the exhaust gas that affects the subsequent separation process. Substantial 
reduction in thermal NOx is another advantage of this process [11]. With the use of pure oxygen 
for the combustion, the major composition of the flue gases is CO2, water, particulates and SO2. 
Particulates and SO2 can be removed by conventional electrostatic precipitator and flue gas 
desulphurization methods, respectively. The remaining gases, contain high concentration of 
CO2 (80–98% depending on fuel used [12]), can be compressed, transported and stored. This 
process is technically feasible [11] but consumes large amounts of oxygen coming from an 
energy intensive air separation unit [13]. This results in high cost and the energy penalty may 
reach over 7% compared with a plant without CCS [14,15]. Also, high SO2 concentration in the 
flue gas may intensify the system's corrosion problems. At present, there is no full scale oxyfuel-
fired projects in the range of 1000–2000MWth under development but a few sub-scale 
commercial demonstration plants are under development worldwide such as the 25MWe and 
250MWe oxy-coal units proposed by CS Energy and Vattenfall, respectively [15]. 
Figure 1.3. Oxyfuel combustion process scheme 
1.2 Separation techniques for carbon dioxide 
Capture of CO2 contributes 75% to the overall CCS cost and CCS increases the electricity 
production cost by 50% [16]. Although these numbers may vary with different CCS schemes, 
reducing the capture cost is the most important issue for the CCS process to be acceptable to 
the energy industry. There are many options for CO2 separation but the optimum CO2 capture 
scheme could be determined by analyzing costs or the context of power generation. A wide 
range of technologies currently exist for separation of CO2 from gas streams, although they 
have not been designed for power-plant scale operations [17]. They are based on different 
physical and chemical processes including absorption, adsorption, cryogenics and membranes 
[18]. The choice of a suitable technology depends on the characteristics of the flue gas stream, 
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which depend mainly on the power-plant technology. Various CO2 separation techniques are 
discussed below. 
1.2.1 Chemical absorption technology 
A liquid sorbent is used to separate the CO2 from the flue gas. The sorbent can be regenerated 
through a stripping or regenerative process by heating and/or depressurization. This process is 
the most mature method for CO2 separation and is preferred for low to moderate CO2 partial 
pressures [19]. Typical sorbents include monoethanolamine (MEA), diethanolamine (DEA) and 
potassium carbonate [20]. Among the various aqueous alkanolamines, such as MEA and DEA, 
Veawab et al. [21] found that MEA is the most efficient one for CO2 absorption with efficiency 
over 90%. Subsequently, Aaron et al. [22] conducted a review on various CO2 capture 
technologies and concluded that the most promising method for CO2 capture for CCS is 
absorption using MEA. An absorption pilot plant with 1 tonCO2/h was constructed and 
successfully tested together with the post-combustion capture technology for a coal-fired power 
plant using a solvent containing 30% MEA [23]. Some other sorbents, such as piperazine and 
anion-functionalized ionic liquid have also received attention in recent years [24]. Piperazine 
has been found to react much faster than MEA, but because it has a larger volatility than MEA, 
its application in CO2 absorption is more expensive and is still under development [25]. One 
important challenge for the large deployment of this technology for CCS is its potential amine 
degradation, resulting in solvent loss, equipment corrosion and generation of volatile 
degradation compounds [26,27], while that atmospheric degradation has not been included. 
Moreover, amine emissions can degrade into nitrosamines and nitramines, which are potentially 
harmful to the human health and the environment. Chilled ammonia process uses aqueous 
ammonium salts (such as ammonium carbonate) to capture CO2 that can make use of waste 
heat to regenerate the CO2 at elevated temperature and pressures to reduce downstream 
compression [28]. This process will generate less problem as compared to those that amine is 
facing with degradation. A scheme of a chemical absorption technology for power plant flue 
gas is depicted in Figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.4. Process flow diagram of a typical chemical absorption system for CO2 recovery from flue gas. 
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1.2.2 Physical absorption process 
For physical absorption, CO2 is physically absorbed in a solvent according to Henry’s Law, 
which means that they are temperature and pressure dependent. Physical solvent processes use 
organic solvents to physically absorb acid gas components rather than reacting chemically. 
Removal of CO2 by physical absorption processes are based on the solubility of CO2 within the 
solvents and the solubility depends on the partial pressure and on the temperature of the feed 
gas. Higher CO2 partial pressure and lower temperature favor the solubility of CO2 in the 
solvents (Absorbent). The solvents are then regenerated by either heating or pressure reduction. 
Physical solvents scrubbing of CO2 are commercially available. Selexol (dimethyl ether of 
polyethylene glycol), a liquid glycol based solvent, has been used for decades to process natural 
gas, both for bulk CO2 removal and H2S removal [29]. Glycol is effective for capturing both 
CO2 and H2S at higher concentration. The Rectisol process, based on low temperature methanol 
(cold methanol), is another physical solvent process that has been used for removing CO2. 
Glycol carbonate is interesting because of its high selectivity for CO2 but it has relatively low 
capacity [30]. Other physical solvents for CO2 removal include propylene carbonate (FLUOR 
process) and N-methyl-2-pyrollidone (Purisol). The physical absorption process is illustrated 
in the Figure 1.5.  
Figure 1.5. Physical absorption to capture CO2 from syngas. 
 
CO2 dissolved in the solvent is recovered by reducing pressure in various flash drums. No heat 
is required to release CO2 due to the low heat of absorption. After depressurization, pure CO2 
streams are released at different pressures. Some CO2 capture applications benefit from a 
mixture of physical and chemical solvents. 
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1.2.3 Physical adsorption 
In contrast to absorption processes which use a liquid absorbent, a solid sorbent is used to bind 
the CO2 on its surfaces. Large specific surface area, high selectivity and high regeneration 
ability are the main criteria for sorbent selection. Typical sorbents include molecular sieves, 
activated carbon, zeolites, calcium oxides, hydrotalcites and lithium zirconate. The adsorbed 
CO2 can be recovered by swinging the pressure (PSA) or temperature (TSA) of the system 
containing the CO2- saturated sorbent. PSA is a commercial available technology for CO2 
recovery from power plants that can have efficiency higher than 85% [31,32]. In this process, 
CO2 is preferentially adsorbed on the surface of a solid adsorbent at high pressure, which will 
swing to low pressure (usually atmospheric pressure) to desorb the adsorbent and release CO2 
for subsequent transport. In TSA, the adsorbed CO2 will be released by increasing the system 
temperature using hot air or steam injection. The regeneration time is normally longer than PSA 
but CO2 purity higher than 95% and recovery higher than 80% can be achieved [33]. Operating 
cost of a specific TSA process was estimated to be of the order of 80–150US $/ton CO2 captured 
[34]. Finally, the use of residues from industrial and agricultural operations to develop sorbents 
for CO2 capture has attracted significant attention to reduce the total costs of capture [35–38]. 
1.2.4 Cryogenic distillation 
Cryogenic distillation is a gas separation process using distillation at very low temperature and 
high pressure, which is similar to other conventional distillation processes except that it is used 
to separate components of gaseous mixture (due to their different boiling points) instead of 
liquid. For CO2 separation, flue gas containing CO2 is cooled to desublimation temperature (-
100 to -135 °C) and then solidified CO2 is separated from other light gases and compressed to 
a high pressure of 100–200 atmospheric pressure. The amount of CO2 recovered can reach 90–
95% of the flue gas. Since the distillation is conducted at extremely low temperature and high 
pressure, it is an energy intensive process estimated to be 600–660 kWh per ton of CO2 
recovered in liquid form [39]. Several patented processes have been developed and research 
has mainly focused on cost optimization [40,41]. 
1.2.5 Chemical looping combustion 
Chemical-looping combustion (CLC), proposed by Richter and Knoche in 1983 [42], divides 
combustion into intermediate oxidation and reduction reactions that are performed separately 
with a solid oxygen carrier circulating between the separated sections. Suitable oxygen carriers 
are small particles of metal oxide such as Fe2O3, NiO, CuO or Mn2O3. A basic CLC system is 
shown in Fig. 1.6 [43]. The CLC has two reactors, one each for air and fuel. The oxygen carrier 
circulates between the reactors. In the air reactor, the carrier is oxidized by oxygen according 
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to reaction (1.1). In the fuel reactor, the metal oxide is reduced by the fuel, which is oxidized 
to CO2 and H2O according to reaction (1.2). 
Fig. 1.6. Chemical-looping combustion. 
 
𝑂2 + 2𝑀𝑒 → 2𝑀𝑒𝑂                                                                                                                  (1.1) 
 
𝐶𝑛𝐻2𝑚 + (2𝑛 +𝑚)𝑀𝑒𝑂 → 𝑛𝐶𝑂2 +𝑚𝐻2𝑂 + (2𝑛 +𝑚)𝑀𝑒                                                  (1.2) 
 
The amount of energy released or required in the reactors depends on these two reactions, as 
well as the temperature of reactions. CLC has several advantages compared with conventional 
combustion. The exhaust gas stream from air reactor is harmless, consisting mainly of N2. In a 
well-designed system, there should no thermal formation of NOx since the regeneration of 
oxygen carrier takes place without flame and at moderate temperatures. The exhaust gas from 
the fuel reactor consists of CO2 and H2O. Separation of CO2 can be done by a condenser, a 
major advantage with CLC which avoids the huge energy penalty necessary in traditional 
amine-scrubbing process to capture CO2, and thus leads to less operational cost. Research in 
metal oxide air separation is focused on cost and the physical and chemical stability of the 
oxygen carriers over many cycles. The particles usually consist of a reactive oxide and a 
supporting inert oxide. While various oxygen carrier particles are under consideration, copper, 
iron, manganese and nickel are the most promising reactive metals [44]. No large-scale 
demonstration has been performed but models predict that a power system utilizing metal oxide 
air separation has significant advantages. The lower irreversibility associated with the 
regeneration step relative to conventional combustion add to the already low energy 
requirement of the inherent separation of CO2 from nitrogen. Brandvoll and Bolland [45] 
reported that the resulting overall energy penalty could be as low as 400 kJ/kg CO2 for a natural 
gas combined-cycle plant, assuming idealized chemical stability of the oxygen carrier. 
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1.2.6 Hydrate-based separation 
Hydrate-based CO2 separation is a new technology by which the exhaust gas containing CO2 is 
exposed to water under high pressure forming hydrates. The CO2 in the exhaust gas is 
selectively engaged in the cages of hydrate and is separated from other gases. The mechanism 
is based on the differences of phase equilibrium of CO2 with other gases, where CO2 can form 
hydrates easier than other gases such as N2 [46]. This technology has the advantage of small 
energy penalty (6– 8%) [5] and the energy consumption of CO2 capture via hydrate could be as 
low as 0.57kWh/kg-CO2 [46]. Improving the hydrate formation rate and reducing hydrate 
pressure can improve the CO2 capture efficiency [46]. Tetrahydrofuran (THF) is a water-
miscible solvent, which can form solid clathrate hydrate structures with water at low 
temperatures. So, the presence of THF facilitates the formation of hydrate and is frequently 
used as a thermodynamic promoter for hydrate formation. Englezos et al. [47] found that the 
presence of small amount of THF substantially reduces the hydrate formation pressure from a 
flue gas mixture (CO2/N2) and offers the possibility to capture CO2 at medium pressures. 
Recently, Zhang et al. [48] studied the effects and mechanism of the additive mixture on the 
hydrate phase equilibrium using the isochoric method and confirmed the effect of THF on 
hydrate formation. US DOE considers this technology to be the most promising long term CO2 
separation technology identified today and is currently in the R&D phase [5,49,50]. 
1.2.7 Membrane separation 
Membranes can be used to allow only CO2 to pass through, while excluding other components 
of the flue gas. The most important part of this process is the membrane which is made of a 
composite polymer of which a thin selective layer is bonded to a thicker, non-selective and low-
cost layer that provides mechanical support to the membrane [51]. This method has also been 
used to separate other gases such as O2 from N2, and CO2 from natural gas. Through the 
development of high efficient membranes, Audus [52] and Gielen [53] achieved a CO2 
separation efficiency from 82% to 88%. The development of ceramic and metallic membranes 
[22] and polymeric membranes [54] for membrane diffusion could produce membranes 
significantly more efficient for CO2 separation than liquid absorption processes. Brunetti et al. 
[55] conducted a general review on current CO2 separation technology using membranes and 
compared with other separation technologies such as adsorption and cryogenic. It pointed out 
that the performance of a membrane system is strongly affected by the flue gas conditions such 
as low CO2 concentration and pressure, which are the main hurdles for applying this technology. 
Furthermore, Bernardo et al. [56] revealed that although there are significant developments in 
gas separation membrane systems, they are still far away to realize the potentialities of this 
technology. 
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1.3 CO2 transport 
Once CO2 is separated from the rest of the flue gas components it needs to be transported to the 
storage site or to the facilities for its industrial utilization. Whatever the chosen final fate of 
CO2, a reliable, safe and economically feasible system of transport is a key feature of any CCS 
project. Depending on the volumes involved a variety of means of transport may be utilized, 
ranging from road tankers to ships and pipelines. Pipelines are considered to be the most viable 
method for onshore transport of high volume of CO2 through long distances as CCS would 
likely involve when widely deployed [57]. Pipelines are also the most efficient way for CO2 
transport when the source of CO2 is a power plant which lifetime is longer than 23 years. For 
shorter period road and rail tankers are more competitive [58]. In order to optimize the 
mass/volume ratio CO2 is carried as dense phase either in liquid or supercritical conditions. 
Supercritical is the preferred state for CO2 transported by pipelines, which implies that the 
pipelines operative temperature and pressure should be maintained within the CO2 supercritical 
envelop, i.e. above 32.1 °C and 72.9 atm. [59]. The typical range of pressure and temperature 
for a CO2 pipeline is between 85 and 150 bar, and between 13 °C and 44 °C to ensure a stable 
single-phase flow through the pipeline [60]. The drop in pressure due to the reduction of the 
hydraulic head along the pipeline is compensated by adding recompression stations. Larger 
diameter pipelines allow lower flow rates with smaller pressure drop and therefore a reduced 
number of recompression stations; on the other hand, larger pipelines are more expensive 
therefore a balancing of costs needs to be considered [60]. Impurities in the CO2 stream 
represent a serious issue because their presence can change the boundaries of the pressure and 
temperature envelope within which a single-phase flow is stable. Moreover, the presence of 
water concentration above 50 ppm may lead to the formation of carbonic acid inside the pipeline 
and cause corrosion problems. Hydrates may also form that may affect the operation of valves 
and compressors. The estimated values of corrosion on the carbon steel commonly used for 
pipeline's construction can be up to 10 mm/year [60,61]. Currently only a few pipelines are 
used to carry CO2 and are almost all for EOR projects. The oldest is the Canyon Reef Carriers 
pipeline, a 225 km pipeline built in 1972 for EOR in Texas (USA). CO2 pipelines are mostly 
made of carbon steel and composed of insulated 12 m sections with crack arresters every 350 
m and block valves every 16–32 km. The onshore pipelines are buried in trenches of about 1 m 
deep. Offshore pipelines in shallow water also need to be deployed in trenches as protection 
from fishing and mooring activities. Deep water pipelines generally do not need to be buried 
unless their diameter is below 400 mm [60,62]. The rate of accidents involving CO2 pipelines 
is relatively low with a value of 0.30/year for every 1000 km calculated during the period 1990–
2001 considered for an overall pipelines extension of 2800 km [63]. The enlargement of the 
pipelines network leads to an increase in the number of accidents up to 0.76/year for every 1000 
km in 2002–2008 calculated over an overall pipeline length of 5800 km [64]. These values are 
still well below the ones involving pipelines for gas/oil or other hazardous fluids. However, the 
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current CO2 pipeline network is far smaller than that for gas/ oil transport, and therefore, the 
statistical significance of these values is somewhat uncertain. For commercial scale CCS 
projects an extensive network of CO2 pipelines needs to be developed. An integrate network, 
where different sources will merge for their final transport to the storage areas, can reduce the 
total pipelines length by 25%, but it will require that all sources produce CO2 stream with the 
same quality (e.g. pressure, T, water content) before being combined together [61]. When the 
flow managed through a network of pipelines increases there is an exponential decrease in the 
cost of transport; models highlight that the cost for transporting CO2 along a 1000 km pipeline 
is around 8 USD/ton for a mass flow of 25 MtCO2/year with a further reduction down to 5 
USD/ton if the flow increases to 200 MtCO2/year [65]. Further cost saving may be achieved 
from there use of existing gas pipelines but their suitability is to be verified. One of the biggest 
uncertainties is the effects on the pipelines' integrity of long term exposure to CO2 fluxes in 
terms of corrosion and potential brittle fractures propagation due to the sharp cooling of the 
pipelines in case of leak of supercritical CO2 [66]. The pipelines have to be periodically 
monitored to assess their integrity and an accurate fiscal metering system is to be in place to 
assure the quantification of the stored fluxes. The equipment used for gas/oil pipelines need to 
be modified to withstand the challenging environment experienced inside a CO2 pipeline. Poor 
lubrication capacity of CO2, high chemical reactivity and high pressure may all affect the 
performance of both monitoring and metering equipment [67]. Other issues could arise from 
the trans-national transport of CO2 and offshore storage due to legal aspects. 
1.4 CO2 geological storage 
CO2 can be stored into geological formations such as deep saline aquifers which have no other 
practical use, and oil or gas reservoirs. Geological storage is at present considered to be the 
most viable option for the storage of the large CO2 quantities needed to effectively reduce global 
warming and related climate change [68–71]. A typical geological storage site can hold several 
tens of million ton of CO2 trapped by different physical and chemical mechanisms [72]. Suitable 
geological sites for CO2 storage have to be carefully selected. General requirements for 
geological storage of CO2 include appropriate porosity, thickness, and permeability of the 
reservoir rock, a caprock with good sealing capability, and a stable geological environment [73]. 
Requirements such as distance from the source of CO2, effective storage capacity, pathways for 
potential leakage and in general economic constrains may limit the feasibility of being a storage 
site. Bachu [74] described the criteria and approaches for selecting suitable geological sites for 
storing CO2, including the tectonic setting and geology of the basin, its geothermal regime, 
hydrology of formation waters, hydrocarbon potential and basin maturity. In addition, economic 
aspects related to infrastructure and socio-political conditions will also affect the site selection. 
Furthermore, although techniques for geological storage can be derived from existing 
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processes, mostly enhanced oil recovery (EOR) projects, there is no real experience yet at 
commercial scale, and the potential long term environmental effects of large amounts of CO2 
stored is also limited. Three different geological formations are commonly considered for CO2 
storage: depleted (or nearly depleted) oil and gas reservoirs, unmineable coal beds, and saline 
aquifers. Deep ocean storage is also a feasible option for CO2 storage although environmental 
concerns (such as ocean acidification and eutrophication) will likely limit its application. It has 
been shown that CO2 storage potential can reach 400–10,000 GT for deep saline aquifers 
compared with only 920 GT for depleted oil and gas fields and 415 GT in unmineable coal 
seams [75]. Different geological settings have different criteria of consideration for their 
reliability as CO2 storage areas. 
1.4.1 Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) 
CO2 can be injected into depleted (or nearly depleted) oil/gas reservoirs to increase their 
pressure and provide the driving force to extract residual oil and gases, while the injected CO2 
remains stored there permanently. Up to 40% of the residual oil left in an active reservoir can 
be extracted after primary production [76]. In fact, fluids injection methods have been widely 
used in the oil and gas extraction industry for decades to enhance the recovery of the residual 
oil and gases. Therefore, there is an economical incentive for injecting CO2 (recovered from an 
associated capture process) into depleted oil and gas reservoirs in order to offset the high CCS 
cost commonly involved in the process. Technologies for injection of CO2 for EOR are mature 
and there are studies on various aspects of EOR, such as migration simulation [77,78], 
geochemical modeling [79,80], and leakage/risk assessment [81]. Several EOR projects for CO2 
storage are ongoing. The large stone is the Weyburn project that started in 2000 in the Weyburn 
oil reservoir in Saskatchewan, Canada. Although the aim of the project is not to investigate the 
potential for CO2 storage, the reservoir is estimated to be able to store more than 30 million ton 
of CO2 captured from a gasification plant in North Dakota, USA and transported to the site 
through a 320 km pipeline.  A number of larger EOR projects with much larger storage capacity 
are planned (such as Hatfield and California DF2) and will be commissioned in the next few 
years. This will build confidence in operators for the feasibility of larger CO2 storage 
demonstration projects. 
 
 
 
16                                                                                                                                                                   Chapter 1 
 
Bibliographic references 
1. Dennis Y.C. Leung, G. Caramanna, M. Mercedes Maroto-Valer (2014). An overview of 
current status of carbon dioxide capture and storage technologies. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 34, 426-443. 
2. Blomen E., Hendriks C., Neele F. (2009). Capture technologies: improvements and 
promising developments. Energy Procedia, 1, 1505–12. 
3. Wall T. F. (2007). Combustion processes for carbon capture. Proceedings of the combustion 
institute, 31; 31–47.  
4. Olajire A.A. (2010). CO2 capture and separation technologies for end-of-pipe application – 
A review. Energy, 35, 2610–28. 
5. Elwell L.C, Grant W.S (2006). Technology options for capturing CO2 – special reports. 
Power; 150, 60–65. 
6. Kanniche M., Gros-Bonnivard R., Jaud P., Valle-Marcos J., Amann J.M., Bouallou C. (2010). 
Pre-combustion, post-combustion and oxy-combustion in thermal power plant for CO2 capture. 
Applied Thermal Engineering, 30, 53–62. 
7. Global CCS Institute (2012). Global status of large scale integrated projects: June2012 
update. 
〈http://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/41146/globalstatusoflargesca
leintegratedprojectsjune2012update.pdf) last access: 06/01/2017. 
8. Global CCS Institute (2012). CO2 capture technologies: pre-combustion capture. 
〈http://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/29756/co2-capture-
technologies-pre-combustion-capture.pdf〉. last access: 06/01/2017. 
9. Nord L.O., Anantharaman R., Bolland O. (2009). Design and off-design analyses of a pre-
combustion CO2 capture process in a natural gas combined cycle power plant. International 
Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 3, 385–392. 
10. Hoffmann S., Bartlett M., Finkenrath M., Evulet A., Ursin T.P. (2009). Performance and 
cost analysis of advanced combined cycles with pre-combustion CO2 capture. Journal of 
Engineering for Gas Turbines and Power, 131, 663-671. 
11. Buhre B.J.P., Elliott L.K., Sheng C.D., Gupta R.P., Wall T.F. (2005). Oxyfuel combustion 
technology for coal-fired power generation. Progress in Energy and Combustion Science, 31, 
283–307. 
12. Zero, Zero Emissions Resource Organization, 〈http://www.zeroco2.no/〉 last access: 
07/01/2017. 
13. Pfaff I., Kather A. (2009). Comparative thermodynamic analysis and integration issues of 
CCS steam power plants based on oxy-combustion with cryogenic or membrane based air 
separation. Energy Procedia, 1, 495–502. 
14. Burdyny T., Struchtrup H. (2010). Hybrid membrane/cryogenic separation of oxygen from 
air for use in the oxy-fuel process. Energy, 35, 1884–97. 
Carbon Capture and Storage                                                                                                                                                    17 
 
15. Global CCS Institute (2012). CO2 capture technologies: oxy-combustion with CO2 capture: 
〈http://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/29761/co2-capture-
technologies-oxy-combustion.pdf〉 last access: 07/01/2017. 
16. Feron P.H.M., Hendriks C.A. (2005). CO2 capture process principles and costs. Oil & Gas 
Science and Technology, 60, 451-459. 
17. Desideri U., Corbelli R. (1998). CO2 capture in small size cogeneration plants: technical 
and economic considerations. Energy Conversion and Management; 39, 857-867. 
18. Jeremy D. (2000). Economic evaluation of leading technology options for sequestration of 
carbon dioxide. Master of Science thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
19. Bhown A.S., Freeman B.C. (2011). Analysis and status of post-combustion carbon dioxide 
capture technologies. Environmental Science & Technology, 45, 8624–32.  
20. Hendriks C (1994). Carbon dioxide removal from coal-fired power plant. Springer 
Science+Business Media. 
21. Veawab A., Aroonwilas A., Tontiwachwuthiku P. (2002). CO2 absorption performance of 
aqueous alkanolamines in packed columns. Fuel Chemistry Division Preprints, 47, 49–50. 
22. Aaron D., Tsouris C. (2005). Separation of CO2 from flue gas: a review. Separation Science 
and Technology, 40, 321–348. 
23. Knudsen J.N., Jensen J.N., Vilhelmsen P.J., Biede O. (2009). Experience with CO2 capture 
from coal flue gas in pilot-scale: testing of different amine solvents. Energy Procedia, 1, 783–
790. 
24. Gurkan B.E., de la Fuente F.C., Mindrup E.M., Fiche L.E., Goodrich B.F., et al. (2010). 
Equimolar CO2 absorption by anion-functionalized anionic liquids, Journal of the American 
Chemical Society, 132, 2116–7. 
25. Bougie F.F., Iliuta M.C. (2011). CO2 absorption in aqueous piperazine solutions: 
experimental study and modeling. Journal of the Chemical & Engineering Data, 56, 1547–54. 
26. Rochelle G.T. (2012). Thermal degradation of amines for CO2 capture. Current Opinion in 
Chemical Engineering, 1, 183–190. 
27. Fredriksen S.B., Jens K.J. (2013). Oxidative degradation of aqueous amine solutions of 
MEA, AMP, MDEA, Pz: a review. Energy Procedia, 37, 1770–7. 
28. Kozak F., Petig A., Morris E., Rhudy R., Thimsen D. (2009). Chilled ammonia process for 
CO2 capture. Energy Procedia, 1, 1419–26. 
29. Davison J., Freund P., Smith A. (2001). Putting carbon back into the ground. IEA 
Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme. 
30. Kovvali A.S., Sirkar K.K. (2002). Carbon dioxide separation with novel solvents as liquid 
membranes. Industrial & Engineering Chemical Research, 41, 2287-95. 
31. Takamura Y., Narita S., Aoki J., Uchida S. (2001). Application of high-PSA process for 
improvement of CO2 recovery system. The Canadian Journal of Chemical Engineering, 79, 
812–816. 
18                                                                                                                                                                   Chapter 1 
 
32. Mc Kee B. (2002). Solutions for the 21st Century: zero emissions technology for fossil fuels. 
IEA. 
33. Clausse M., Merel J., Meunier F. (2011). Numerical parametric study on CO2 capture by 
indirect thermal swing adsorption. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 5, 1206–
13. 
34. Kulkarni A.R., Sholl D.S. (2012). Analysis of equilibrium-based TSA processes for direct 
capture of CO2 from air. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, 51, 8631–45. 
35. Maroto-Valer M.M., Lu Z., Zhang Y., Tang Z. (2008). Sorbents for CO2 capture from high-
carbon fly ashes. Waste Management, 28, 2320–8. 
36. Olivares-Marín M., Maroto-Valer M.M. (2010). Preparation of a highly microporous carbon 
from a carpet material and its application as CO2 sorbent. Fuel Processing Technology, 92, 322–
9. 
37. Olivares-Marín M., Drage T.C., Maroto-Valer M.M. (2010) Novel lithium-based sorbents 
from fly ashes for CO2 capture at high temperatures. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas 
Control, 4, 623–9. 
38. Olivares-Marin M., Maroto-Valer M.M. (2012). Development of adsorbents for CO2 capture 
from waste materials: a review. Greenhouse Gases: Science and Technology, 2, 20–35. 
39. Gottlicher G, Pruschek R. (1997). Comparison of CO2 removal systems for fossil-fuelled 
power plants. Energy Conversion and Management, 38, S173–178.  
40. Burt S.S., Baxter A., Bence C., Baxter L.L. (2010). Cryogenic CO2 capture for improved 
efficiency at reduced cost. Proceedings of the AICHE annual meeting, 7–12.  
41. Tuinier M.J., Annaland M.V.S., Kramer G.J., Kuipers J.A.M. (2010). Cryogenic CO2 
capture using dynamically operated packed beds. Chemical Engineering Science, 65, 114–9. 
42. Richter H.J., Knoche K. (1983). Reversibility of combustion processes, efficiency and 
costing - second law analysis of processes. ACS Symp Ser, 235, 71-85. 
43. Ryden M., Lyngfelt A. (2006). Using steam reforming to produce hydrogen with carbon 
dioxide capture by chemical e looping combustion. Int. J. Hydrogen Energy, 31, 1271-83. 
44. Lyngfelt A., Kronberger B., Adanez J., Morin J., Hurst P. (2004). The grace project: 
development of oxygen carrier particles for chemical looping combustion, design and operation 
of a 10 kW chemical-looping combustor. GHGT-7 Conference, Vancouver (Canada), 
September 5-9. 
45. Brandvoll O., Bolland O. (2004). Inherent CO2 capture using chemical looping combustion 
in a natural gas fired power cycle. J. Eng. Gas Turbines Power, 126, 316-21. 
46. Fan S., Wang Y., Lang X. (2011). CO2 capture in form of clathrate hydrate-problem and 
practice. Proceedings of the 7th international conference on gas hydrates (ICGH), UK, July 17-
21. 
Carbon Capture and Storage                                                                                                                                                    19 
 
47. Englezos P., Ripmeester J.A., Kumar R., Linga P. (2008). Hydrate processes for CO2 capture 
and scale up using a new apparatus. Proceedings of the international conference on gas hydrates 
ICGH. 
48. Zhang Y., Yang M., Song Y., Jiang L., Li Y., Cheng C. (2014). Hydrate phase equilibrium 
measurements for (THF+SDS+CO2+N2) aqueous solution systems in porous media. Fluid 
Phase Equilib, 370, 12–18. 
49. Babu P., Kumar R., Linga P. (2013). Progress on the hydrate based gas separation (HBGS) 
process for carbon dioxide capture. AICHE annual meeting. San Francisco (USA), November 
3-8.  
50. Sun D., Englezos P. (2014). Storage of CO2 in a partially water saturated porous medium 
at gas hydrate formation conditions. Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control, 25, 1-8. 
51. Rackley S.A. (2010). Carbon capture and storage. Burlington, USA. Butterworth-
Heinemann, Elsevier.  
52. Audus H. (2000). Leading options for the capture of CO2 at power stations. Proceedings of 
the 5th international conference on greenhouse gas control technology. Cairns (Australia), 
August 13-16. 
53. Gielen D. (2003). Energy policy consequences of future CO2 capture and sequestration 
technologies. Proceedings of the 2nd annual conference on carbon sequestration. Alexandria, 
VA, May 5-8. 
54. Yave W., Car A., Funari S.S., Nunes S.P., Peinemann K.V. (2009). CO2-philic polymer 
membrane with extremely high separation performance. Macromolecules, 43, 326–33. 
55. Brunetti A., Scura F., Barbieri G., Drioli E. (2010). Membrane Technologies for CO2 
separation. J. Membr. Sci., 359, 115–25.  
56. Bernardo P., Drioli E., Golemme G. (2009). Membrane gas separation: a review/state of the 
art. Ind Eng Chem Res, 48, 4638–63. 
57. Svensson R., Odenberger M., Johnsson F., Stromberg L. (2004). Transportation systems for 
CO2 – application to carbon capture and storage. Energy Convers Manag, 45, 2343–53. 
58. Norisor M., Badea A., Dinca C. (2012). Economical and technical analysis of CO2 transport 
ways. U.P.B. Sci Bull Series C, 74, 127–38. 
59. Johnsen K., Helle K., Roneid S., Holt H. (2011). DNV recommended practice: design and 
operation of CO2 pipelines. Energy Procedia, 4, 3032–9. 
60. Forbes S.M., Verma P., Curry T.E., Friedmann S.J., Wade S.M. (2008). Guidelines for 
carbon dioxide capture, transport, and storage. World Resour Inst. 
61. International Energy Agency Report. (2010) CO2 pipeline infrastructure: an analysis of 
global challenges and opportunities. Element Energy Limited. Final Report. 
62. FEED. CO2 transport pipeline. Except for public use. (2011). Vattennfal Europe. Job no: 
P10111. 
20                                                                                                                                                                   Chapter 1 
 
63. Gale J., Davison J. (2004). Transmission of CO2-safety and economic considerations. 
Energy, 29, 1319–28. 
64. Parfomak P.W., Folger P., Vann A. (2009). Carbon dioxide (CO2) pipelines for carbon 
sequestration: emerging policy issues. Congressional research service report. 
65. Chandel M.K., Pratson L.F., Williams E. (2010). Potential economies of scale in CO2 
transport through use of a trunk pipeline. Energy Convers Manag, 51, 2825–34. 
66. Rabimdran P., Cote H., Winning I. G. (2011). Integrity management approach to reuse of 
oil and gas pipelines for CO2 transportation. Proceedings of the 6th Pipeline Technology 
Conference. Hannover Messe, Hannover, Germany, April 04-05. 
67. DNV (2010). Design and operation of CO2 pipelines. Det Norke Veritas. Recommended 
Practice DNV-RP-J202. 
68. Celia M.A., Nordbottena J.M. (2009). Practical modeling approaches for geological storage 
of carbon dioxide. Ground Water, 47, 627–38. 
69. Van der Zwaan B., Smekens K. (2009). CO2 capture and storage with leakage in an energy-
climate model. Environ Model Assess, 14, 135–48. 
70. Yang F., Bai B.J., Tang D.Z., Dunn-Norman S., Wronkiewicz D. (2010). Characteristics of 
CO2 sequestration in saline aquifers. Pet Sci, 7, 83–92. 
71. Myer L. (2011). Global status of geologic CO2 storage technology development. United 
States carbon sequestration council report July 2011. 
72. Doughty C., Freifeld B.M., Trautz R.C. (2008). Site characterization for CO2 geological 
storage and vice versa: the Frio brine pilot, Texas, USA as a case study. Environ Geol, 54, 1635–
56. 
73. Solomon S., Carpenter M., Flach T.A. (2008). Intermediate storage of carbon dioxide in 
geological formations: a technical perspective. Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control, 2, 502–10. 
74. Bachu S. (2000). Sequestration of CO2 in geological media: criteria and approach for site 
selection in response to climate change. Energy Convers Manag, 41, 953–70. 
75. International Energy Agency Report. (2004). Improvements in power generation with post-
combustion capture of CO2. IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programs, PH4/33. 
76. Blunt M., Fayers F.J., Orr F.M. (1993). Carbon dioxide in enhanced oil recovery. Energy 
Convers Manag, 34, 1197–204. 
77. Vidiuk K., Cunha L.B. (2007). A simulation study of effects of operational procedures in 
CO2 flooding projects for EOR and sequestration. Proceedings of the Canadian international 
petroleum conference. Calgary, Alberta, June 12-14. 
78. Chiaramonte L., Zoback M., Friedmann J., Stamp V., Zahm C. (2011). Fracture 
characterization and fluid flow simulation with geomechanical constraints for a CO2–EOR and 
sequestration project Teapot Dome Oil Field, Wyoming, USA. Energy Procedia, 4, 3973–80. 
79. Preston C., Moneab M., Jazrawib W., Brown K., Whittakerd S., Whitee D., et al. IEA GHG 
Weyburn CO2 monitoring and storage project. Fuel Process, 86, 1547–68. 
Carbon Capture and Storage                                                                                                                                                    21 
 
80. Cantucci B., Montegrossi G., Vaselli O., Tassi F., Quattrocchi F., Perkins E.H. (2009). 
Geochemical modeling of CO2 storage in deep reservoirs: the Weyburn Project (Canada) case 
study. Chem Geol, 265, 181–97. 
81. Klusman R.W. (2003). Evaluation of leakage potential from a carbon dioxide EOR/ 
sequestration project. Energy Convers Manag, 44, 1921–40. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2 
Risk analysis 
Nowadays, environment and safety constitute two equivalent terms of a duo considered the base 
for a sustainable equilibrium or, more in general, for the anthropic activity. The problems linked 
with safety and environmental impact of the process industry are becoming more and more 
crucial to obtain a correct and sustainable advancement of the industrial society. In this context, 
risk analysis is becoming a fundamental tool to deal with that issues. 
2.1 Introduction to Risk Analysis 
The term “risk” (R) is a probabilistic quantity defined as the product between occurrence 
frequency of an undesired event (f) and the damage magnitude (M): 
𝑅 = 𝑓 ∗ 𝑀                                                                                                                                     (2.1) 
which is different from the common meaning given to “danger” that is an intrinsic property. As 
we can see from (2.1), a risk could be large when it refers to frequent events with modest 
consequences, but also when it refers to seldom events but with catastrophic consequences. 
This distinction is important in the risk reduction phase, in fact it is possible to limit the risk of 
accidental events through the realization of preventive measures, namely reducing the 
probability that an accident occurs, otherwise applying protective measures, that is mitigating 
the consequences. A simple diagram of the conceptual points of the risk analysis is reported in 
the Figure. 2.1: 
Figure 2.1. Risk analysis conceptual diagram 
System description
Risk identification
Consequence evaluation Frequency evaluation
Risk determination
Risk acceptance
YES
NO
Risk reduction measures
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The frequency and magnitude study occurs in a distinct and independent manner; it is their 
combination which gives a certain risk. Although, while adopting all the possible interventions, 
it is not possible to achieve a zero-risk situation, but there always be a risk called residue which 
have to be managed and controlled. In order to perform a risk analysis in a plant, two different 
groups of methods could be used: qualitative one and quantitative one. Both of them are 
necessary, the first kind of methods are less accurate but cheaper: these usually are used to find 
out the most critical part of the plant. The second kind of methods that are more accurate but 
expensive are applied on the results came from the qualitative methods. The accidents historical 
analysis, Hazop, FTA and ETA are the techniques applied in this work to accomplish the risk 
analysis, that are going to be described in the following. 
2.2 Accidents historical analysis 
This is a qualitative method based on the collection of all the accidents that are “similar” at the 
supposed one, happened: 
• In the same place; 
• In similar plants; 
• Regarding the same type of substances; 
• In similar climate conditions. 
Several databases are available (ex. MHIDAS, ARIA, EGIG, CONCAWE, WOAD). They are 
essential for this technique: they have to be detailed at the right point, have a significant number 
of gathered events and contain quasi-accidents too. This hazard identification method permits 
to apply the lessons learnt from accidents occurred in the past, a really good advantage in terms 
of risk prediction. On the other hand, weak points arise: 
• Limited reliability and homogeneity of the sources; 
• Limited information regarding root causes and first phases of the development of the 
scenarios; 
• Difficulties in the elaboration of the information at statistical level. 
In conclusion, this is a useful tool, but needs to be integrated with more systematic techniques. 
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2.3 HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability study) 
This is a technique which allows the individuation of potential risks and operability issues 
caused by deviations from the project goals and linked, in particular, to malfunctions during the 
plant operation. Malfunctions mean not only mechanical failures or equipment breakdowns but 
also all the phenomena that influence the standard design parameters. The Hazop technique is 
based on a complete plant description and on the systematic analysis of each part or element; 
in the Figure 2.2 is summarized the logic procedure. This work is drove by an experts team 
having lots of experience and with solid bases of risk analysis.  
Figure 2.2. Methodology of HAZOP 
 
A typical team for Hazop evaluation include: 
• Chairman (safety engineer); 
• Scribe (safety engineer); 
• One representatives of each discipline involved in design (Process, Mechanical, Control 
and Instrumentation, etc.) 
• Representatives of commitment; 
• On call basis: other specialists (according to specific issues). 
They identify the most critical points (nodes) with the aim of foresee accidents that would never 
be found out from the historical analysis. 
Divide system into nodes
Define node and design intent
Select parameter and deviation
Identify all possible causes
Assess all credible consequences
Identify existing safeguards
Propose recommendations
Last deviation?
Last node?
End
Yes
Yes
No
No
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There is also the need of a big amount of information regarding all plant aspects: 
• Process Flow Diagram (PFD); 
• Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID); 
• Lay-out; 
• Chemical hazard data; 
• Blowdown and venting systems; 
• Other specific documentation. 
The study is founded on the use of guide words coupled with the most important process 
parameters and permits to identify the possible accidents with the consequent creation of the 
fault tree; the guide words summary in presented in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1. Guide words of Hazop 
Guide words Meaning Comments 
NO, NOT, NONE 
The complete negation of 
the intention 
No part of the design intention is achieved, but nothing 
else happens. 
MORE, HIGHER, 
GREATER 
Quantitative increase 
Applies to quantities such as flowrate and temperature 
and to activities such as heating and reaction. 
LESS, LOWER Quantitative decrease 
Applies to quantities such as flowrate and temperature 
and to activities such as heating and reaction. 
AS WELL AS Qualitative increase 
All the design and operating intentions are achieved 
along with some additional activity, such as 
contamination of process streams. 
PART OF Qualitative decrease 
Only some of the design intentions are achieved, some 
are not. 
REVERSE The logical opposite of 
Most applicable to activities such as flow or chemical 
reaction. Also applicable to substances, for example, 
poison instead of antidote. 
OTHER THAN Complete substitution 
No part of the original intention is achieved – the 
original intention is replaced by something else. 
SOONER THAN 
Too early or in the wrong 
order 
Applies to process steps or actions. 
LATER THAN 
Too late or in the wrong 
order 
Applies to process steps or actions. 
WHERE ELSE In additional locations 
Applies to process locations, or locations in operating 
procedures. 
 
The plant is divided into cells with entrance and exit and the process/plant behavior is analyzed 
with the variation of properties like temperature, pressure, flowrate, level, composition, etc. It 
permits to obtain a logic-probabilistic analysis for the identification of the most critical points 
of the plant and the determination of the expected frequencies. To conclude, it has to be said 
that this is a powerful tool, but time consuming due to the large amount of details of the analysis 
that have to be taken into account. 
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2.4 FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) 
Once the possible failures and the relative consequences have been identified, in a qualitative 
way, it can go on with the quantification of their damage; this means give the frequency and 
magnitude evaluation. The FTA is a graphical representation of the different logic relations 
between the system components damages, human errors, failure mechanisms or whatever other 
cause which contributes to generate relevant accidents permitting additionally, thanks to data 
regarding the failure rate, to quantify the occurrence probability. It starts from a Top event 
(accidental event with unwanted consequences) and ends to the origin. It has to be considered 
each cause that has been found as a new consequence; the method is repeated until the 
elementary causes have been identified. The FTA construction permits a qualitative evaluation, 
concerning the elementary causes individuation which determine the unwanted event, and a 
quantitative evaluation, which consists in calculating the occurrence frequency of that Top 
event. The various base events are in relation each others through logic operators and with a 
defined symbology, presented in the Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3. Symbology of the FTA 
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Every equipment part has a failure frequency, which represents how many failures occur in a 
defined period of time: for example, a failure frequency of 3.6e-7 years-1 means that there will 
occur 3.6 failures in 10,000,000 years. These values are means taken from failure distribution 
curves. Now a brief and simple FTA example is made in Figure 2.4.  
Figure 2.4. FTA example. All the failures are linked together only through “and” and “or” gates. 
 
It can be seen that for the failures 1 and 2 there is an “and” gate, which means the event will 
verify only if both failures occur. For the failures 4 and 5 it is different, because they are linked 
together with an “or” gate, meaning that the event occurs only if at least one of the failures will 
verify. 
 
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = [(1 ∗ 2) + 3] ∗ (4 + 5)                                                                                (2.1) 
 
Once the FTA is built it permits the quantification of failure frequency and Top event frequency 
with the Boolean algebra. The safety engineer task is to reduce that frequency, by the 
introduction, for instance, of alarms, indicators, valves, by-pass, etc. in the proper manner and 
location, until an acceptable value is reached. 
2.5 ETA (Event Tree Analysis) 
This is a graphical representation which individuates the frequencies and the different scenarios 
that can occur starting from a given Top event. Its construction and study are made after the 
FTA, and in a different way, in particular an inductive path is followed: starting from a 
determined Top event, all the possible scenarios related to it are identified with their occurrence 
frequencies. This analysis doesn’t demand to postulate a Top event, as in the Fault Tree, but 
needs to individuate preliminarily all the systems, phenomena and conditions that can influence 
a phenomenon evolution. Each of these systems, phenomena, etc. constitute a Node of the tree, 
which can have two exits, often indicated with “Yes” or “No”, respectively indicating if the 
1
System failure
2
3 4 5
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event occurs or not. At every exit, an occurrence probability is associated, which can be also 
calculated with the FTA application. In an overall analysis, these two techniques are 
complementary. An example of the event tree is in the Figure 2.5.  
Figure 2.5. ETA example 
 
The ETA can be used to study the failure combination of components which lead to different 
possible failure and operating conditions of the system; it is commonly used, however, for the 
definition and calculation of the scenario probability which can derive from the same starting 
point. The tree nodes are made up of phenomena like the immediate or delayed ignition, the 
occurrence of different weather conditions, the protection or mitigation systems intervention 
etc. When the FTA and ETA are included together, they form the so called Bow-tie Diagram. 
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Chapter 3 
Accidents historical analysis 
In order to improve the CCS best practices, it was performed an accidents historical analysis 
with the objective of find all the industrial accidents happened involving all the substances 
which can be used in the capture section of a CCS plant. There are a lot of flammable and toxic 
chemicals that can be encountered in this type of plant, and the amount required is great too, 
due to the large flue gas flowrate. At the end, the most disastrous events will be useful to detect 
the potential most dangerous substance. 
3.1 Accidents historical analysis 
Between all the phases of CCS processes, the focus of this work is on the capture section and 
its relative technologies (chemical absorption, physical absorption and adsorption, cryogenic 
distillation, chemical looping combustion and hydrate-based separation); transport and storage 
are not considered. The carbon capture, as seen in the Chapter 1, can be done with a wide range 
of techniques, exploiting all the various physical and chemical phenomena. The choice of a 
suitable technology relies on the characteristics of the flue gas stream, which depends mainly 
on the power-plant technology. The list of substances which can be used for the carbon capture 
was served to address the research; the accidents found are listed in the following paragraphs. 
3.1.1 Accidents regarding CO2 
• Date: 2008; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:19; 
Description: approximately 15 tons of CO2 was accidentally released from a fire 
extinguishing installation in Monchengladbach, Germany. Due to coincidental failure 
of door seals, the released CO2 was not contained by the building and it spreads outside 
where there were very still air conditions. There were no fatalities from the incident but 
107 people were intoxicated, 19 of whom were hospitalized [1]. 
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3.1.2 Accidents regarding MEA (monoethanolamine) 
• Date: 23/07/1984; 
Dead:17; 
Hospitalized:22; 
Description: a vapor leak was noticed on a vessel, precisely from an amine absorber 
removing H2S from acid stream, pressured. Refinery workers, including the outside 
operator and an assistant outside operator, unsuccessfully attempted to by-pass the 
vessel and to depressurize it. The leak in the vessel wall had spread around the entire 8 
feet circumference of the vessel and it erupted like a missile. The top 45 feet of the 
vessel was lifted by the vapor cloud. The bottom 10 feet of the vessel stayed intact on 
the ground. The eruption of the vessel released a massive vapor cloud which ignited, 
causing a fire ball. This explosion engulfed much of the refinery in flames. Firefighters 
from the Union Oil Fire Brigade responded immediately with the company’s two 
engines, followed closely by the Romeoville Fire Department. As a result of the 
explosion, many towers, tanks, and other refinery structures began to rupture or collapse 
and the site’s fire hydrant system was damaged. So, firefighters were forced to draft 
water from a nearby sanitary canal. They were just beginning to attack the flames when 
a tank containing LPG erupted. The explosion created a huge fireball that rose thousands 
of feet into the air. Several members of the Union Oil Fire Brigade were caught in the 
blast. Once the burning structures were isolated, fire officials determined that allowing 
the fires to burn out on their own was the safest way to extinguish the blaze. The cause 
of this incident was the presence of cracks in the vessel walls [2]. 
3.1.3 Accidents regarding NH3 and (NH4)2CO3 
• Date: 21/02/1991; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: the accident occurred in one of the two glass lined storage tanks, 35 m3 
capacity each, holding the recirculated acid solution (about 29% of sulfuric acid) used 
to absorb the residual ammonia from the gaseous effluents of the phtalocyanines process 
unit. This solution was enriched with ammonium carbonate coming from the ammonia 
treatment unit. The pH of the solution was manually controlled once per shift and 
adjusted if necessary by adding sulfuric acid solution so that the pH was maintained 
within the slightly acidic range (5 to 6). The solution's pH was periodically checked 
(every 8 hours) by an operator. When the accident occurred, the operator realized too 
late that the ammonium sulfate and ammonium carbonate solution was becoming basic 
and suddenly added a 60% sulfuric acid solution to it. This resulted in an abnormal 
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production of carbon dioxide that over pressurized the tank which exploded because of 
inadequate pressure relieving capacity (the hydraulic trap with which the tank was 
equipped was not sufficient to withstand the peak pressure generated). The collapse of 
the tank caused the release of the solution (about 20 m3), which was partially recovered 
in the containment basin of the 2 glass lined tanks and partially in the yard. The rest of 
the solution was collected, through the sewer network, in the emergency basin of ACNA 
[3]. 
• Date: 29/07/2012; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:6; 
Description: the detailed course of the accident was as follows: about 7:00 a.m., after 
regular check of the installation, a worker reported to his supervisor emission of the 
process solution (containing ammonium carbonate). The emission occurred in the upper 
part of the exchanger. The person responsible for maintenance works was called in deal 
with the damage. In the meantime, the affected exchanger was being prepared for the 
examination and repair. The exchanger was washed with water. This task involved 
opening and closing the proper valves on a pump and injection of water. After the 
exchanger had been washed, the process solution was added to the installation but with 
omitting the damaged exchanger. This allowed the maintenance staff to remove the 
isolation of the exchanger in order to examine it. After the examination of the exchanger 
was performed, it was decided that leakage would be temporary stopped with a caulker 
band. In order to do this, the internal rescue unit was called. They noticed punctual leaks 
in a few places. Before they started sealing operation it was decided to wash the 
exchanger again (doing this twice, in the same way as for the first time). While the 
caulker band was installed inside the exchanger there was water at a low pressure. After 
installation of the band it was decided to check the tightness using water. It appeared 
that it was not tight enough because water was leaking. The worker closed one valve to 
stop the water flow. At the same time, he also opened another valve allowing the process 
solution to get into the system. The other worker, not being aware that process solution 
was being injected, thought the tightness tests were going on so he cut (with the valve) 
the flow of the process solution. This caused the process solution to go the broken 
exchanger. Suddenly, the upper part of the exchanger ruptured causing the emission of 
the process solution. Due to its evaporation, toxic cloud was formed. One worker fell 
down because of the gust that appeared. The other five workers were intoxicated. All of 
them were injured and taken to the hospital. The analysis of the course of the accident 
showed that together with the emission of ammonium carbonate also ammonia was 
released, most probably from the absorption column due to the fact that one valve was 
partially opened [4]. 
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• Date: 08/05/1991; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: as a small leak was observed in a valve packing joint, it was tightened 
causing the valve insertion point to rupture. The attempt to isolate the valve was 
unsuccessful as two other valves could not be closed. A large amount of ammonia could 
escape through the broken valve. The fire brigade intervened using protective clothing. 
The accident occurred during normal operation of an ammonia plant in a food additives 
industry. The component involved was a valve on an ammonia pipeline operating at 2 
bar and at a temperature of -10°C [5]. 
• Date: 01/06/1992; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: the ammonia pipes leaked due to a faulty screw connection. Material 
defects caused damage in the screw connection. Liquid ammonia in the pipes was at 
constant pressure of 1.2 MPa [6]. 
• Date: 19/04/1996; 
Dead:2; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: two workers of a subcontractor (external company) were performing the 
repair (maintenance) of an engine throttle valve for the level control of a spherical tank. 
During the repair the spindle was pushed out of the fitting. Liquid ammonia was released 
with 14 bars through the section of the opening [7]. 
• Date: 16/06/1997; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:6; 
Description: while carrying out repair works, one staff member of a construction 
company damaged an underground ammonia pipeline with a concrete cutting apparatus. 
This caused a release of liquid ammonia through the breach [8]. 
• Date: 04/01/2005; 
Dead:1; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: during the morning, it was foreseen to raise the ammonia level in the 
ammonia storage tank to a perceivable level by pumping cold ammonia through a drain 
pipe. As preparation of this operation the injection of cold ammonia on the tank head 
was interrupted and a refrigerant compressor was started. In the context of this operation 
at 11:05 a.m. the tank drainage valve, used as intake, was completely opened while the 
valve on the other end of the drain pipe was opened to ¼. During this operation, a worker 
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was staying on a platform at 3 m height, whereas another worker was standing below 
the platform. Both workers were permanently in contact over radio with the control 
room. Both workers heard an unusual noise after opening the valve of the drainage pipe. 
The worker on the platform closed the drain valve of the tank a few seconds after and 
left the platform over an access ladder. The control room operator noticed approximately 
at the same time a rapid pressure increase in the tank. In that moment 11:10 a.m. a loud 
bang occurred with the sudden release of ammonia gas which dispersed around against 
the wind [9]. 
• Date: 24/09/1996; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:11; 
Description: the release occurred due to a valve opened in error. The release occurred 
in an installation for the dilution of anhydrous ammonia into a 10% ammonia solution 
employed in order to limit (reduce) the corrosion during the distillation of crude oil. 
This release occurred on one (or two) 1/4 turn valves isolating the dissolving column 
from a tank of 7 cubic meters of capacity (containing 3.8 tons of liquefied ammonia 
under 8 bars of pressure at the time of the accident) [10]. 
• Date: 06/07/1989; 
Dead:2; 
Hospitalized:5; 
Description: at 3:30 p.m. the crankcase of an Uraca horizontal action 3 throw pump, 
used to boost liquid ammonia pressure from 300 psi to 3400 psi, was punctured by 
fragments of the failed pump-ram crankshaft. The two operators investigating the 
previously reported noises from the pump were engulfed in ammonia and immediately 
overcome by fumes. Once the pump crankcase was broken, nothing could be done to 
prevent the release of the contents of the surge drum (10 tons were released in the first 
three minutes). The supply of ammonia from the ring main could only be stopped by 
switching off the supply pump locally. The crankshaft of the Uraca pump failed 
catastrophically smashing itself through the crankcase. Failure of the crankshaft was 
due to the propagation of a fatigue crack through the web separating the first and second 
crank pins. Metallurgical investigations found no initiating defect leading to crack 
propagation. It is thought that the failure was due to some overload of the web/crank pin 
radius at some unknown time. No inspections were foreseen for this component. The 
pump design was not adequate [11]. 
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• Date: 07/07/1989; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: a storage tank for aqueous ammonia solutions was up for maintenance 
(replacement of the bottom part). The tank got a new bottom on Wednesday (05/07/89) 
and was replaced Wednesday evening. After mechanical completion of the replacement 
work, the Thursday evening a trial had been undertaken to fill the tank up, but 
overpressure was registered in the tank and also the flange connecting the feeding line 
to the tank leaked. Consequently, the filling operation was stopped. The problems were 
reported to the maintenance department, the flange connection was repaired and the 
pressure relief line checked. The trial to fill the tank was not reported to the shift 
supervisor. A shift change took place and the supervisor recorded in the production log-
book that the tank was empty. The next day (Friday 07/07/89) a safe work permit was 
issued by the supervisor of the next shift to the mechanics to disconnect the piping 
associated with this tank for further repair. The repair work proceeded and during the 
grinding of a disconnected pipe, a mechanic noticed a whistling sound and hid, together 
with the 3 others mechanics, behind a concrete tank farm wall. Soon afterwards, the 
tank exploded. The top of the tank was blown over an adjacent manufacturing building, 
landing at the grass-strip between the adjacent building and the office-buildings and 
struck into another office building (approximately 60 meters away) which was empty. 
The ammonia vapors/air explosive mixture formed in the storage tank after the trial was 
probably ignited by the grinding of the disconnected pipe. The pressure relief lines also 
failed to operate as expected but from the Original Report is not fully clear if it was 
caused by a wrong component design or not [12]. 
3.1.4 Accidents regarding Selexol (dimethyl ether of polyethylene glycol) 
• Date: 01/09/1993; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:4; 
Description: the accident occurred in a plant producing synthesized active ingredients 
for the pharmaceutical industry. An explosion and a fire occurred in one of the 
workshops of the plant. At 6:30 a.m. the operation started, 30 min before shift end. At 
6:45 a.m. the temperature threshold was reached, the operators started to cool the reactor 
(it contains aluminum trichloride anhydrous, sodium tetrahydroborate, imide, dimethyl 
ether triethylene glycol) in order to maintain the temperature around 65°C but the 
reaction ran away causing temperature and the pressure rise in the vessel. The operator 
nearest to the reactor smelled an unpleasant odor: through the sight glass he saw a glow 
preceding the explosion. Employees at 15 m distance perceived a blow. A flame 
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projected through the workshop, other flames shot out from a joint and other damaged 
connections of the reactor. Employees outside the building perceived a blow just before 
the explosion. A flame several meters high was visible for some seconds at the exit of a 
chimney connected with the reactor rupture disk (calibrated at 0.5 bar) that burst, 
allowing the decompression of the reactor [13]. 
3.1.5 Accidents regarding Rectisol (methanol) 
• Date: 25/09/1981; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:6; 
Description: during normal operation, there was an unexpected and unwanted formation 
of methyl nitrate in a vessel for collecting chlorine residuals, which was collecting also 
methanol. Probably this has been caused by the introduction of hydrogen chloride 
contaminated with methanol in the electrolysis system. The explosion in the vessel 
caused a break in the pipe connecting it to the chlorine condensation plant, and hence a 
partial evaporation on the contents followed. The plant was shut-down and the 
population outside the establishment was alerted [14]. 
• Date: 08/09/1982; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: an unintentional spillage of methanol into an electric cable way caused a 
short-circuit which ignited the flammable liquid resulting in a large fire. The operators 
were able to leave the site of the fire. The population external to the establishment was 
alerted and preparations for an extended evacuation were initiated [15]. 
• Date:15/03/1993; 
Dead:1; 
Hospitalized:1; 
Description: on a alcoholysis band (rubber transport-band) took place an explosion 
through the open inspection valve air arrived in the band-case, which together with the 
existing vapors (methanol and methyl acetate, about 25 kg) created an explosive 
mixture. The releasing ignition spark arose obviously in the cutter, that is directly 
connected to the band and that during the inspection was on duty. Due to the explosion, 
the shift leader died and the department head was injured. Immediately after the 
explosion got into fire the rubber-transport-band, part of the facing building front and 
the asphalted tar paper. The firemen brought the fire under control. The quenching water 
was collected in a vessel of the biological clarification plant, but about 7 kg of methanol 
arrived in the nearby river. Due to the explosion, the polymerization from polyvinyl 
acetate should be interrupted. Emergency disconnection caused a rupture of the rupture-
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disk and of the vessel which in turn provoked the escape of a mixture (1000 kg) of 
methanol and polyvinyl acetate circa 250 kg, leaked mixture flowing over the roof of 
the installation. The fire brigade ordered as a precaution the evacuation of the 
installation and of the neighboring buildings. Dioxin analysis showed the usual values 
in burnt components [16]. 
• Date: 07/11/1998; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: due to a leak in a container, the release of substances caused a fire in an 
experimental fatty acid methyl esters production plant (causes are unknown). After the 
leak had been discovered, at 11:50 a.m. the shut-down of whole plant (the container's 
stirring system and the pumps) was initiated, and the valves were closed. At 12:02 p.m. 
the shut-down was complete. At 12:34 p.m., a fire involving the leaking container was 
noticed. The fire brigade was informed, the emergency plan was activated, 
extinguishing operations started with the help of transportable firefighting gear. At 
12:47 p.m., the disintegration of the tank and a release of flammable material into the 
plant hall could be observed from the control room. The smoke production became more 
intense and a major fire developed. The fire brigade's main concern was cooling the 
methanol tank and a roof. The extinguishing operations were concluded at 4:00 p.m., 
but had to be started again at 5:00 p.m., and went on, with several pauses, until the late 
evening [17]. 
• Date: 12/02/1985; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:4; 
Description: while two operators were charging fiber drums of a penicillin material into 
a reactor containing a mixture of acetone and methanol, an explosion occurred at the 
reactor man-hole. The two operators were blown back by the force of the explosion. 
They were covered with a wet burnt powder. Two other operators, who were opening 
the drums 2 meters away, were also blown back and covered with wet powder. 
Subsequently, all four operators were drenched under emergency showers. They 
suffered superficial burns to the hands and face and spent one night in a local hospital. 
They suffered no side-effects. Investigations showed that the incident was initiated by 
the ignition of solvent vapors, which resulted in a dust explosion of the dry powder. The 
solvent mixture in the reactor did not ignite. Tests carried out on the polyethylene liners 
inside the fiber drums showed they were earthed to the reactor at the time of the 
explosion but they were of the non-conducting type. The most probable cause of the 
ignition was an electrostatic discharge from the polyethylene bags during the reactor 
charging. The underlying causes were inadequate process analysis and design plant, 
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together with a lack of safety culture, that allowed to operate with the risk of a dust 
explosion [18]. 
• Date: 15/05/1987; 
Dead:4; 
Hospitalized:1; 
Description: taking also into account witnesses who heard a first big explosion and a 
few seconds later two other more suffocated explosions, it was deduced that most likely 
the empty tank No 43 exploded first causing the explosions of tanks No 44 and 45. The 
explosions of tanks No 44 and 45 were followed by the fire of the contained methanol. 
Tank No 42 was also partially damaged because of the explosion of the adjacent No 43: 
it was still emitting hexane vapors during the inspection. Probably the explosion was 
caused by the ignition of a mixture of residual methanol vapors with air formed during 
the degassing operations of tank No 43 (it was degassed with air in order to recover 
nonane). According to Carmagnani's officials the tank's cleaning was considered a 
routine operation: depending on the substances to remove, water or air were used for 
cleaning purposes. In case of purging with water, washing water gathered by a draining 
system was conveyed to a waste-water treatment plant. In case that two incompatible 
substances had to be loaded subsequently into the same tank, purging with air was used 
(air was pumped in the vessel through a man-hole and was discharged from other 
openings). This situation occurred for tank No 43 because methanol residues were 
considered incompatible with nonane that had to be stored. All purging operations were 
normally carried out without neither nitrogen protection nor by monitoring the 
surrounding environment for the presence of flammable gases. No fixed explosimeter 
or smoke detectors were installed but the operators could make use of portable 
explosimeters and personal protection devices (breathing apparatuses, filters, masks). 
The first aid room was equipped with stretches and medical supplies and fire 
extinguishers were placed as laid down under the Fire Brigade's Regulations [19]. 
3.1.6 Accidents regarding cryogenic distillation 
• Date: 07/06/1996; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: during the start-up phase of the cryogenic unit a separator exploded, 
releasing ethane, ethylene, methane and hydrogen. The bursting of a tank was caused 
by a 1600 mm long incipient crack which had been formed at the inside of the tank 
along a weld line (a ferritic basis metal had been welded with an austenitic weld metal). 
The hydrogen induced incipient crack that was caused by the alternating load during 
start-up and shut-down phases in the course of the operating time. This hydrogen 
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induced cracking has been originated by the geometric form variation and the resulting 
plastic deformation in the area of the damaged longitudinal weld. This incipient 
cracking was favored by the high tensile strength of the austenitic weld metal with its 
particularly accentuated martensitic composite area along the transition between weld 
metal and basis metal and was also favored by its physical characteristics which differ 
strongly from the basis metal. There was possibly a lack of maintenance [20]. 
• Date: 21/09/2003; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:1; 
Description: on September 21th, at about 7:30 a.m., the Isotec on-call system operator 
received an automatic pager alert indicating an alarm condition in a cryogenic nitric 
oxide (NO) distillation unit. Arriving at the facility at about 7:50 a.m., he observed 
reddish-brown gas venting from the distillation unit vacuum pump exhaust - which 
indicated a breach in the column piping within the vacuum jacket. Nitric oxide - a toxic 
gas - was venting to the atmosphere and reacting with air to form nitrogen dioxide 
(NO2), also a toxic gas. The responding employee immediately notified his supervisor, 
who called the 911 dispatcher. Isotec management and Sigma-Aldrich, the parent 
company of Isotec, were then notified. The reddish-brown gas cloud was observed 
drifting southwest from the site and slowly dissipating. By 8:15 a.m., employees secured 
the leak by closing the vacuum pump suction valve. Shortly thereafter, the vapor cloud 
was no longer visible. The operations manager and the other five Isotec employees 
believed they could safely remove the nitric oxide from the N3 distillation column and 
vacuum jacket, and proceeded with the necessary preparations. Their position was based 
on successful application of the same strategy to a column malfunction on September 
18, 1998. Distillation column N4 (same design as N3) had developed a NO leak into the 
vacuum jacket and vented nitric oxide from the vacuum exhaust. While closely 
monitoring pressure and temperature, operators successfully emptied the nitric oxide 
from the column and vacuum jacket. Once the September 21 leak was secured, 
personnel began installing temporary tubing to empty the nitric oxide in the 
malfunctioning column. Concurrently, they closely monitored the pressure inside the 
column, which was behaving as in 1998 when column N4 leaked nitric oxide. The 
pressure stabilized at no more than 130 pounds per square inch (psi) - well below the 
vacuum jacket calculated burst pressure of 1645 psi. Isotec personnel noted that the 
condenser was “vigorously venting nitrogen vapor”, which indicated increased heat load 
in the column. At 10:15 a.m. - with no warning - a violent explosion destroyed the 
distillation column, the blast containment structure, and nearby buildings. Windows 
were blown out of the main office building, about 140 feet from the explosion; and glass 
shards lacerated the hand of an Isotec employee. No other injuries were reported. Small 
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chunks of concrete and metal shards were propelled as far as 1000 feet and fell on 
adjacent property. Three houses north of the facility were struck by debris, causing 
minor damage to two roofs and a picture window. A large steel panel from the blast 
containment structure struck and dislodged a 52000 - pound gaseous carbon monoxide 
(CO) storage vessel, pushing it about 10 feet off its foundation. A second steel panel 
severely damaged adjacent equipment. A ruptured fill line vented CO gas, which then 
ignited and burned for about 1 hour, until the vessel was empty. As a precaution, the fire 
department requested that the police evacuate a 1-mile radius to protect the community 
from metal shards or other debris in the event that the CO vessel exploded. The 
evacuation order was lifted after 24 hours [21]. 
• Date: 30/07/2000; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: an explosion occurred at a specialty gas manufacturing facility in Dayton, 
Nevada. The plant manufactured small quantities of nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), a 
specialty chemical used for etching silicon wafers and for cleaning silicon production 
equipment in the microprocessor fabrication industry. While the building housing the 
process was damaged, no personnel were injured. Exponent conducted an engineering 
investigation of the incident to determine the cause of the explosion, to understand the 
chemical reactions leading to the incident, and to quantify the explosive energy of the 
blast. The incident occurred in the last stage of the manufacturing process, inside a 
distillation column/reboiler assembly that separates residual nitrogen (N2) and fluorine 
(F2) gas from condensed NF3. A process disruption occurred approximately 90 minutes 
before the explosion, when the plant received a liquid nitrogen delivery that was 
significantly colder than the nitrogen already present in the onsite tank. Liquid nitrogen 
was used as the heat exchange fluid inside the distillation column condenser and the 
influx of the colder delivery caused sufficient temperature decrease within the column 
condenser to liquefy fluorine. Analysis revealed that the condensed fluorine reacted with 
the stainless steel packing material to initiate a localized exothermic event inside the 
column/reboiler. The hot spot spread and initiated combustion between the stainless 
steel packing material and the liquid NF3. The energy released by these exothermic 
reactions evaporated NF3 and caused a rapid increase in the temperature and pressure 
of the column/reboiler contents. The gaseous outflow choked at the column/reboiler 
outlets and the resulting pressure buildup, estimated at approximately 8000 psi, 
ultimately failed the reboiler. The total energy yield was low (approximately 1.5 lb-
TNT) and no one was injured. However, this incident serves to highlight the care 
necessary in manufacturing highly reactive fluorinated gases [22]. 
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3.1.7 Accidents regarding NiO 
• Date: 21/02/2000; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:6; 
Description: the accident occurred in a foundry. Six persons were injured by the 
explosion of the furnace. The treatment operation which was being carried out at the 
time of the accident was the fusion of a batch composed of metals and minerals, in order 
to obtain alloy ingots. The batch was composed of 836 kg of sand (mainly nickel oxide, 
silicon dioxide and aluminum), 6690 kg of Fe - Mo - Co - Ni alloy in ingots of 350 kg, 
540 kg of ordinary steel and 240 kg of lime. The nickeled sand in the bottom of the 
furnace did not melt completely; the intense mixing of the metal by the injection of 
gaseous oxygen helped the nickeled sand rise to the surface. The nickel oxide was 
deoxidized by passing through the metal; the oxygen thus released combined with the 
carbon present in the bath and produced large quantities of CO and CO2 very rapidly. 
This hypothesis is substantiated by the recording of the gas analyzers; a calculation 
shows that this reaction produces 73 m3 of CO in a few seconds. The not melted nickel 
sand in the bottom of the furnace contained a certain quantity of water and gas, held 
under pressure by a layer of pasty metal. The blast would have been due to the release 
of these during the fusion operation was an aggravating factor in the number of people 
injured gases; a calculation shows that this phenomenon generates 8 m3 of steam. The 
analysis of the causes concludes that the loading method (nickeled sand in the bottom 
of the furnace) was the origin of the accident [23]. 
3.1.8 Accidents regarding THF (tetrahydrofuran) 
• Date: 03/12/2004; 
Dead:1; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: at the end of every week the coating pan of the coating tower was to be 
cleaned. Normally this is done using scraping knives. However, it is easier to clean the 
pan if the pan is soaked in solvent for some time. For this purpose, methyl ethyl ketone 
(MEK) can be tapped into safety cans. A second solvent, tetrahydrofuran (THF), was 
available on site and is more effective in soaking the pan than MEK. The operators knew 
this and got the THF from the first floor of the coating tower using a bucket (no safety 
cans were available here since this was not the normal operation). In the accident, the 
victim also filled a bucket with THF on the first floor, but this time the liquid ignited 
(most likely from an electrostatic discharge). Knowing that the coating tower was a 
classified area, the victim has tried to carry the burning bucket outside. For that he had 
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to go down the stairs. In the staircase, he fell and dropped the bucket. This had two 
effects: burning liquid was splashed onto his clothes and there was a larger burning 
surface, resulting in a large fire, surrounding the victim. He was able to get out of the 
staircase and ran (with his clothes burning) towards a colleague in a nearby room. This 
colleague was able to put out the fire on his clothes. However, the burns were so severe 
that the victim died one day later [24]. 
• Date: 24/10/1995; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:1; 
Description: an explosion and a fire of an organic chemical occurred at a chemical 
factory. By pressurizing a drum can with air, tetrahydrofuran (THF) was transferred to 
a tank. The drum can exploded and a fire occurred. The method was imperfect and 
unsuitable, although static electricity preventive measures were taken. Therefore, a 
combustible gas-air mixture in the drum can is considered to have been ignited by static 
electricity sparks generated by a liquid flow, followed by an explosion [25]. 
3.1.9 Accidents regarding an ASU (Air Separation Unit) 
• Date: 1978; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: the incident in Lae occurred in a very small plant (about 1 ton per day of 
oxygen). It was of modern design in that the liquid oxygen from the top column sump 
was pumped to cylinder-filling pressure then returned to the main exchanger to impart 
its cold to the feed air. The center of the explosion was the main exchanger, made of 
copper, not aluminum. This is the point at which the liquid oxygen evaporates, leaving 
behind the dissolved acetylene or other hydrocarbons, and the possibility of their 
accumulation. The ASU was closed to an acetylene works, which might have been a 
rich source of contamination [26]. 
• Date: 25/12/1997; 
Dead:0; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: a serious explosion in an air separation unit in Bintulu (Malaysia) occurred. 
Since the cause of the explosion was not obvious, a large number of possible scenarios 
was generated, followed by a systematic process of elimination. Ultimately, conclusive 
evidence was obtained that combustible airborne particulates had passed the main 
purification section of the air separation unit. These combustible contaminants had 
accumulated on the aluminum main vaporizers of the distillation column. Once 
hydrocarbon combustion was triggered, it led to aluminum combustion which generated 
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heat and vaporized the cryogenic liquids. This led to rapid pressure build up and 
explosive rupture of the distillation column. The exact ignition mechanism remains 
unclear, but a low activation energy chemical mechanism, involving radical reactions to 
provide the initiating trigger, has been proposed. However, by designing a purification 
system capable of efficiently removing aerosol material and other fouling contaminants, 
and by a proper design of the oxygen reboiler it is possible to design a plant that can be 
operated safely in an aerosol polluted environment [27]. 
• Date: 31/12/2001; 
Dead:1; 
Hospitalized:0; 
Description: on that day, the oxygen flow had been redirected for a certain period of 
time to the cooling tower over a by-pass line. In the same day, the oxygen flow was 
again switched from the by-pass line to the product pipe with the aim of directing the 
oxygen into the storage tank. Before starting oxygen storage operations, the product 
pipe had to be cleaned, due to the fact that the product pipe had not been used for a 
certain period of time and that contamination could not be excluded. The cleaning 
operation was performed by flushing the pipe with the product (oxygen). Due to the fact 
that the valve did not close correctly, oxygen was released over the pipe into the gravel 
bed near the tank and into the atmosphere instead of flowing into the oxygen storage 
tank. Switching from the by-pass line to the product pipe was made over a remote 
control from the control room of the other air separation unit. The monitoring system 
showed the opening of the flush valve and the closing of the valve after 2.5 min. In 
reality the flush valve was not closed. Oxygen spread over the site and it has to be 
assumed that it reached also the administration building at a distance of approximately 
50 meters. At 4:55 p.m. a fire broke out inside the building and an employee was killed. 
The fire destroyed most rooms on the ground floor and on the first floor of the building. 
The fire detectors responded in rapid sequence, it has therefore to be assumed that the 
fire spread very rapidly. The fire brigade brought the fire rapidly under control and 
extinguished it. A collaborator was inside the building when the fire broke out because 
one of the plant operators had requested him to check directly on-site the alarm signal 
released by an analyzing device. The analyzer indicated an oxygen content in the 
nitrogen cooling circuit near to the threshold value of 0.3 ppm. A defect in the analyzer 
was suspected. The collaborator instructed to check the analysis came into the 
installation at 4:00 p.m. and controlled the corresponding analysis. He contacted the 
control room communicating that no errors could be found and his intention to leave the 
installation. Shortly after, the fire detectors responded. The oxygen content 
measurement in the nitrogen cooling circuit of the air separator is an essential control 
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parameter for the cooling process. The values measured do not give any clue with 
regards to the oxygen content of the ambient air in the surroundings [28]. 
3.2 Historical analysis results 
It has been found that the most disastrous accident was the one regarding MEA happened in 
Romeoville, Illinois (USA); for this reason, it is described with more details in the following. 
Ethanolamine is an organic chemical compound which is flammable and toxic: in the Appendix 
is a present a detailed safety data sheet. This was a really destructive accident happened on 23 
July 1984, which caused 17 deaths, 22 hospitalized persons and 530 million dollars for repairs 
and compensation. Everything starts with a vapor leak noticed on a vessel at 5.45 p.m.: it was 
a pressured amine absorber removing H2S from an acid stream (55 feet tall, 1 in thick carbon 
steel, 34 tons of storage). Refinery workers, including the outside operator and an assistant 
outside operator, unsuccessfully attempted to by-pass the vessel and to depressurize it. At 5.52 
p.m., the leak in the vessel wall had spread around the entire 8 feet circumference of the vessel 
and it erupted like a missile. The top 45 feet of the vessel was lifted by the vapor cloud. The 
bottom 10 feet of the vessel stayed intact on the ground. The eruption of the vessel released a 
massive vapor cloud which ignited, causing a fire ball. This explosion engulfed much of the 
refinery in flames. Firefighters from the Union Oil Fire Brigade responded immediately with 
the company’s two engines, followed closely by the Romeoville Fire Department. As a result 
of the explosion, many towers, tanks, and other refinery structures began to rupture or collapse 
and the site’s fire hydrant system was damaged. So, firefighters were forced to draft water from 
a nearby sanitary canal. They were just beginning to attack the flames when a tank containing 
LPG erupted. The explosion created a huge fireball that rose thousands of feet into the air. 
Several members of the Union Oil Fire Brigade were caught in the blast. Firefighters were 
needed to both put out the flames and also prevent more refinery structures from catching fire. 
Once the burning structures were isolated, fire officials determined that allowing the fires to 
burn out on their own was the safest way to extinguish the blaze. The fires burned throughout 
the night at temperatures of 2200 °C, luckily without further explosions or loss of life, even 
though some workers jumped into the Illinois & Michigan Canal to escape the extreme heat. 
3.2.1 Amine vessel failure analysis 
As required by law, the inside of the vessel was inspected every two years. The inspectors were 
Union Oil employees in management positions. The vessel was last inspected three months 
before the explosion and the vessel inspectors found no problems with the vessel. Testimony 
from one of Union Oil’s own engineers indicated that his metallurgical testing performed after 
the explosion indicated that there were cracks in the vessel walls at least four years before the 
accident. The plaintiff’s evidence established that Union Oil’s vessel inspectors made only a 
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visual inspection which was inadequate to detect cracking within the vessel walls. The evidence 
indicated that Ultrasonic and wet magnetic particle testing techniques were well known and 
used in the oil industry to detect vessel wall cracking, but Union Oil did not use them on this 
vessel. In the Figure 3.1 it can be seen the amine vessel after the amine vessel after the 
explosion. 
 
Figure 3.1. Amine absorber column after the explosion, Romeoville, Illinois (USA), 1984 
 
Three other primary contributors to the settlement, Santa Fe Braun, Inc., UOP, Inc., and the 
Ralph M. Parsons Company, had responsibilities relating to the erection, process design and 
functioning of this vessel. One of Santa Fe Braun’s corporate predecessors, C.F. Braun and 
Company, was the general contracting firm that erected the vessel. Its engineers helped to 
determine the process requirements and capabilities of this vessel, specifically including what 
amount of chemical activity would go on within the vessel. UOP was also involved in those 
decisions, made with respect to process engineering. The Ralph M. Parsons Company has been 
hired by Union Oil to revamp part of the refinery, including the subject vessel. In its revamp, 
Parsons altered some of the process requirements of that vessel, and as well, made independent 
determinations of the suitability of the vessel and its characteristics for use in the amine treating 
system. The Union Oil Company alleged that the process design work done by these three 
companies was inadequate in that it failed to provide for sufficient safeguarding against 
corrosion which contributed to the cracking and the failure of the vessel. Union Oil determined 
that the operation of the subject vessel had caused significant metallurgical problems to the 
bottom portion of the vessel and that one of the vessel sections would need to be replaced. 
Welders from the Morrison Construction Company attempted to replace a major section of the 
vessel but due to poor quality control and inadequate welding work, were taken off the job by 
Union Oil and replaced by welders from the Nooter Corporation. Nooter’s welders finished the 
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job using specifications which the Union Oil Company claimed were inadequate. The welding 
specifications used by Morrison and Nooter contributed to the "high hardness" of the metal 
adjacent to the weld, which made it more brittle and subject to failure. Metallurgical testing 
work done after the explosion, both by engineers retained by Union Oil and engineers retained 
by the Illinois State Fire Marshall, showed that the cracking in this vessel which lead to the 
explosion and fire started in the metal adjacent to the welds done by Morrison and Nooter [2]. 
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Chapter 4 
Capture process simulation 
Starting from the point that the capture process using MEA is probably the most dangerous one, 
the next step is to perform a simulation in Aspen Plus of this process, in particular an existing 
pilot plant is taken as reference. The aim will be to perturb the flue gas operating conditions 
and see if and how the process will respond to them. The simulation will be brought to its 
physical and chemical limits: in this way, the most critical section will be identified. 
4.1 Carbon capture process with MEA 
The previous research and analysis have been useful to understand that capture processes 
involving MEA can really increase the riskiness of a plant and that a particularly high level of 
attention is absolutely needed. MEA is an organic chemical compound well known for its use 
in gas scrubbing, particularly in this case for flue gas scrubbing; it is unfortunately also a toxic 
and flammable substance. To find out the most hazardous part of a carbon capture plant working 
with MEA, it has been run a simulation with Aspen Plus. Feed conditions and unit operation 
block specifications in the rate-based model was provided from a pilot plant study at the 
University of Kaiserslautern (2012) [1]. 
4.1.1 Model components 
In the Table 4.1 are represented the chemical species present in the process. 
 
Table 4.1. Components used in the model 
ID Type Name Formula 
MEA Conventional Monoethanolamine C2H7NO 
H2O Conventional Water H2O 
CO2 Conventional Carbon dioxide CO2 
H3O+ Conventional H3O+ H3O+ 
OH- Conventional OH- OH- 
HCO3- Conventional HCO3- HCO3- 
CO3-2 Conventional CO3-- CO3-2 
MEAH+ Conventional MEA+ C2H8NO+ 
MEACOO- Conventional MEACOO- C3H6NO3- 
N2 Conventional Nitrogen N2 
O2 Conventional Oxygen O2 
CO Conventional Carbon monoxide CO 
H2 Conventional Hydrogen H2 
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H2S Conventional Hydrogen-sulfide H2S 
HS- Conventional HS- HS- 
S-2 Conventional S-- S-2 
CH4 Conventional Methane CH4 
C2H6 Conventional Ethane C2H6 
C3H8 Conventional Propane C3H8 
 
4.1.2 Physical properties 
The unsymmetrical electrolyte NRTL property method (ENRTL-RK) and PC-SAFT equation 
of state are used to compute liquid and vapor properties, respectively, in this rate-based MEA 
model. CO2, H2S, N2, O2, CH4, C2H6, and C3H8 are selected as Henry-components (solutes) to 
which Henry’s law is applied. Henry’s constants are specified for these components with water 
and MEA. In the reaction calculations, the activity coefficient basis for the Henry’s components 
is chosen to be Aqueous. Therefore, in calculating the unsymmetrical activity coefficients 
(GAMUS) of the solutes, the infinite dilution activity coefficients will be calculated based on 
infinite-dilution condition in pure water, instead of in mixed solvents. 
The Henry’s constant parameters of CO2 H2S, CH4, C2H6, and C3H8 are obtained from the 
literatures or regressed with the VLE data (see Table 4.2). The other Henry’s constants are 
retrieved from the Aspen Databank. 
 
Table 4.2. Henry’s constants 
Solute Solvent Source 
CO2 H2O Yan and Chen (2010) [4] 
H2S H2O Regression with H2S-H2O VLE data [5-12] 
CH4 H2O Regression with CH4-H2O VLE data [13] 
C2H6 H2O Regression with C2H6-H2O VLE data [14] 
C3H8 H2O Regression with C3H8-H2O VLE data [15] 
CO2 MEA Zhang and Chen (2011) [16] 
H2S MEA Set to that of H2S in H2O 
CH4 MEA Regression with CH4-H2O-MDEA VLE data [17,18] 
C2H6 MEA Regression with C2H6-H2O-MDEA VLE data [18] 
C3H8 MEA Regression with C3H8-H2O-MDEA VLE data [19] 
 
The PC-SAFT parameters of MEA are regressed from the vapor pressure data [20-23], the heat 
of vaporization data [24-25], the liquid heat capacity data [26-27] and the liquid density data 
[28-30]. Those of H2O are obtained from Gross and Sadowski [31], and those of the other 
components are retrieved from the Aspen Databank. The characteristic volume parameters of 
H2O for the Brelvi-O’Connell Model, VLBROC, are obtained from Brelvi and O’Connell [32], 
those of CO2 are obtained from Yan and Chen [4], those of CH4 and C2H6 are regressed with 
the CH4-H2O [13] and C2H6-H2O [14] binary VLE data, and those of MEA, H2S, C3H8, N2, O2 
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and CO are defaulted to their critical volume in the Aspen Databank. Unless specified 
otherwise, all molecule-molecule binary parameters and electrolyte-electrolyte binary 
parameters are defaulted to zero. All molecule-electrolyte binary parameters are defaulted to 
(8, -4), average values of the parameters as reported for the electrolyte NRTL model [33]. The 
nonrandomness factor is fixed at 0.2. The NRTL interaction parameters between MEA and H2O 
are determined from the regression with binary VLE data [23,33-37], excess enthalpy data 
[33,38-40] and heat capacity data [27, 1,42]. The interaction energy parameters between H2O 
and (MEAH+, HCO3
-), GMENCC, and those parameters between H2O and (MEAH+, 
MEACOO-), GMENCC and GMENCD, are regressed using the VLE data [43-46], absorption 
heat data [47], heat capacity data [42,45] and speciation concentration data [48]. The interaction 
energy parameters between H2O and (MEAH
+, HS-), GMENCC and GMENCD, are regressed 
with the H2S solubility data in aqueous MEA solution [49-50]. The dielectric constants of 
nonaqueous solvents are calculated by the following expression: 
 
𝜀 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 (
1
𝑇
−
1
𝐶
)                                                                                                                        (4.1) 
 
The parameters A, B and C for MEA are 35.76, 14836.0 and 273.15, which are derived from 
Dean et al. [51]. The liquid molar volume model and transport property models have been 
validated and model parameters regressed from literature experimental data. Specifications of 
the transport property models include: 
• For liquid molar volume, the Clarke model, called VAQCLK in Aspen Plus, is used 
with option code 1 to use the quadratic mixing rule for solvents. The interaction 
parameter VLQKIJ for the quadratic mixing rule between MEA and H2O is regressed 
against experimental MEA-H2O density data from Kapadi et al. [52]. The Clarke model 
parameter VLCLK/1 is also regressed for the main electrolyte (MEAH+, HCO3
-), 
(MEAH+, MEACOO-) and (MEAH+, CO3
-2) against experimental MEA-H2O-CO2 
density data from Weiland [53]; that for  (MEAH+, HS-) is set to that of  (MEAH+, 
HCO3
-); 
• For liquid viscosity, the Jones-Dole electrolyte correction model, called MUL2JONS in 
Aspen Plus, is used with the mass fraction based Aspen liquid mixture viscosity model 
for the solvent. There are three models for electrolyte correction and the MEA model 
always uses the Jones-Dole correction model. The three option codes for MUL2JONS 
are set to 1 (mixture viscosity weighted by mass fraction), 1 (always use Jones and Dole 
equation when the parameters are available), and 2 (Aspen liquid mixture viscosity 
model), respectively. The interaction parameters between MEA and H2O in the Aspen 
liquid mixture viscosity model, MUKIJ and MULIJ, are regressed against experimental 
MEA-H2O viscosity data from Kapadi et al. [52] and Wadi et al. [54]. The Jones-Dole 
model parameters, IONMUB, for MEAH+, and MEACOO- are regressed against MEA-
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H2O-CO2 viscosity data from Weiland [53]; that of HCO3
- is regressed against KHCO3-
H2O viscosity data from Palaty [55]; that of CO3
2- is regressed against K2CO3-H2O 
viscosity data from Pac et al. [56]; and that of HS- is regressed against MDEA-H2OH2S 
viscosity data from Rinker et al. [57]; 
• For liquid surface tension, the Onsager-Samaras model, called SIG2ONSG in Aspen 
Plus, is used with its option codes being -9 (exponent in mixing rule) and 1 (electrolyte 
system), respectively. Predictions for the MEAH2O-CO2 system can be in the range of 
the experimental data from Weiland [53], which themselves have questionable qualities 
due to MEA degradation during experiments; 
• For thermal conductivity, the Riedel electrolyte correction model, called KL2RDL in 
Aspen Plus, is used; 
• For binary diffusivity, the Nernst-Hartley model, called DL1NST in Aspen Plus, is used 
with option code of 1 (mixture viscosity weighted by mass fraction). 
In addition to the updates with the above transport properties, the aqueous phase Gibbs free 
energy and heat of formation at infinite dilution and 25°C (DGAQFM and DHAQFM) and heat 
capacity at infinite dilution (CPAQ0) for MEAH+ and MEACOO- are regressed with the VLE 
data [43-46], absorption heat data [47], heat capacity data [42, 45] and speciation concentration 
data [48]. The CPAQ0 of HCO3
-, CO3
-2 and HS- are the average values of heat capacity between 
298 K and 473 K taken from Criss and Cobble [58], and that of S-2 is calculated from the Criss-
Cobble correlation [58] with the entropy value from Wagman et al. [59]. 
4.1.3 Reactions 
MEA is a primary ethanolamine, as shown in Figure 4.1. It can associate with H+ to form an 
ion MEAH+, and can also react with CO2 to form a carbamate ion MEACOO
-. 
Figure 4.1. MEA molecular structure 
The electrolyte solution chemistry has been modeled with a CHEMISTRY model with 
CHEMISTRY ID = MEA (as seen in Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2. Chemistry ID: MEA 
Capture process simulation                                                                                                                                         55 
 
This CHEMISTRY ID is used as the global electrolyte calculation option in the simulation by 
specifying it on the Global sheet of the Properties | Specifications form. Chemical equilibrium 
is assumed with all the ionic reactions in the CHEMISTRY MEA. In addition, two REACTION  
models called Absorber (used in the absorber, 303-353 K) and Stripper (used in the stripper, 
353-393 K) have been created. In Absorber/Stripper, all reactions are assumed to be in 
chemical equilibrium except those of CO2 with OH
- and CO2 with MEA (as seen in Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3. Reaction ID: Absorber/Stripper 
 
The equilibrium constants for reactions 1-7 in MEA are calculated from the standard Gibbs 
free energy change. DGAQFM, DHAQFM, and CPAQ0 of MEAH+ and MEACOO-, which are 
used to calculate the standard MEAH+ and MEACOO- Gibbs free energy, are determined in 
this work. The DGAQFM (or DGFORM), DHAQFM (or DHFORM), and CPAQ0 (or CPIG) 
parameters of the other components can be obtained from the databank of Aspen Plus. Power 
law expressions are used for the rate-controlled reactions (reactions 4-7 in Absorber/Stripper). 
The general power law expression is: 
 
𝑟 = 𝑘(𝑇/𝑇0)
𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝 [(
−𝐸
𝑅
) (
1
𝑇
−
1
𝑇0
)]∏ (𝑥𝑖𝛾𝑖)
𝑎𝑖𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                      (4.2) 
 
Where: 
• r = rate of reaction; 
• k = pre-exponential factor; 
• T = absolute temperature; 
• T0 = reference temperature; 
• n = temperature exponent; 
• E = activation energy; 
• R = universal gas constant; 
• N = number of components in the reaction; 
• xi = mole fraction of component i; 
• yi = activity coefficient of component i; 
• ai = the stoichiometric coefficient of component i in the reaction equation. 
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If T0 is not specified, the reduced power law expression is used: 
 
𝑟 = 𝑘𝑇𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−𝐸
𝑅𝑇
)∏ (𝑥𝑖𝛾𝑖)
𝑎𝑖𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                                                       (4.3) 
 
In this work, the reduced expression is used. In equation (4.3), the concentration basis is mole 
gamma, the factor n is zero, k and E are given in Table 4.3 
 
Table 4.3. Parameters k and E in equation (3.3) 
Reaction No. k E [cal/mol] 
6 1.33e+17 13249 
7 6.63e+16 25656 
8 3.02e+14 9855.8 
9 (Absorber) 5.52e+23 16518 
9 (Stripper) 6.50e+27 22782 
 
Note that Absorber and Stripper share all kinetic parameters except those of reaction 9. The 
kinetic parameters for reaction 6 (forward reaction) are taken from the work of Pinsent et al. 
[60], and the kinetic parameters for reaction 7 (reverse reaction) are calculated by using 
equation (3.4) with the kinetic parameters of reaction 6 and the equilibrium constants of the 
reversible reactions 6 and 7: 
 
𝑘𝑟
𝑎 =
𝑘𝑓
𝑎
𝐾𝑒𝑞
𝑎                                                                                                                                       (4.4) 
 
Where: 
• 𝑘𝑓
𝑎 = rate constant of the forward reaction, mole gamma basis; 
• 𝑘𝑟
𝑎 = rate constant of the forward reaction, mole gamma basis; 
• 𝐾𝑒𝑞
𝑎  = equilibrium constant, mole gamma basis. 
The kinetic parameters of reaction 8 in Table 3.3 are derived from the work of Hikita et al. [3] 
and the kinetic parameters of reaction 9 are calculated by using the kinetic parameters of 
reaction 8 and the equilibrium constants of the reversible reactions 8 and 9. Two sets of linear 
approximations (respect to 1/T) for the equilibrium constants (calculated from the Gibbs free 
energy change) are used for Absorber and Stripper, respectively. One is the linear 
approximation of the equilibrium constant for the temperature from 303 to 353 K (for the 
absorber) and the other is the linear approximation for the temperature from 353 to 393 K (for 
the stripper). Two sets of kinetic parameters of reaction 9 for Absorber and Stripper are 
obtained using equation (3.4), as listed in Table 3.3. 
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4.1.4 Simulation approach 
The flowsheet, which can be seen in the Figure 4.4, closely simulates of the pilot plant cited in 
Notz, Mangalapally, and Hasse [1] which incorporates an absorption and stripping column, heat 
exchange between the two columns, and water and amine recycles. The operating conditions of 
this plant were chosen to be as close to those used in case 1 as possible. Where data necessary 
for the simulation were not reported reasonable estimates for these missing data were made. An 
amine makeup stream and a water makeup stream were not present in the pilot plant, but were 
added to the simulation to maintain mass balance and to aid convergence. 
 
Figure 4.4. Rate-based MEA simulation flowsheet in Aspen Plus 
 
Major unit operations in this model have been represented by Aspen Plus blocks as outlined in 
Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4. Aspen Plus unit operations blocks in the rate-based MEA model 
Unit operation Aspen Plus block Comments / Specifications 
Absorber RadFrac 1. Calculation type: Rate-Based 
2. 20 stages 
3. Top pressure: 0.97708 bar 
4. Reaction: Reaction ID is ABSORBER for all stages 
5. Packing type: FLEXIPAC® 250Y 
6. Diameter: 0.125m 
7. Total height: 4.62m 
8. Wash section height: 0.42m 
9. Absorber section height: 4.2m 
10. WATEROUT flowrate: 28.53 kg/h 
11. Mass transfer coefficient method: Bravo (1985) [61] 
12. Interfacial area method: Bravo (1985) [61] 
13. Flooding method: Wallis [62] 
14. Heat transfer coefficient method: Chilton and Colburn 
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15. Film resistance options: Discrxn for liquid film; Film for 
vapor film 
16. Flow model: VPlug 
17. Estimates: provide temperature at stages 1, 12 and 20. These 
estimates are intended to aid convergence 
Stripper RadFrac 1. Calculation type: Rate-Based 
2. 20 stages 
3. Top pressure: 1.999 bar 
4. Reaction: Chemistry ID is MEA for condenser and reboiler, 
and then Reaction ID is STRIPPER for all other stages 
5. Packing type: FLEXIPAC® 250Y 
6. Diameter: 0.125m 
7. Total height: 2.92m 
8. Wash section height: 0.42m 
9. Stripper section height: 2.5m 
10. Distillate rate: 6.93 kg/h 
11. Reboiler duty: 7.05 kW 
12. Condenser temperature: 18°C 
13. Mass transfer coefficient method: Bravo (1985) [61] 
14. Interfacial area method: Bravo (1985) [61] 
15. Flooding method: Wallis [62] 
16. Heat transfer coefficient method: Chilton and Colburn 
17. Film resistance options: Discrxn for liquid film; Film for 
vapor film 
18. Flow model: VPlug 
19. Estimates: provide temperature at stages 20. This estimate 
is intended to aid convergence 
HX1 HeatX 1. Calculation type: Shortcut 
2. Hot inlet – Cold outlet temperature difference: 5.27°C 
3. Cold side outlet pressure: 2.9bar 
4. Valid phases: vapor-liquid both sides 
HX2 Heater 1. Outlet temperature: 112.85°C (set to match experimental 
data for inlet temperature for stripper caused by heat losses after 
heat recovery exchanger 
2. Outlet pressure: 2.9bar 
3. Valid phases: vapor-liquid 
HX3 Heater 1. Outlet temperature: 40°C 
2. Outlet pressure: 2bar 
3. Valid phases: vapor-liquid 
Pump Pump 1. Discharge pressure: 2.9bar 
 
Major inlet and outlet streams and properties are summarized in Table 4.5. The stream 
LEANIN, LEANOUT and WATERIN are tear streams in the simulation. Initial guesses for 
LEANIN and WATERIN were taken from the experimental data and shown in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5. Major experimental stream properties 
Stream ID FLUEGAS LEANIN RICHOUT CO2OUT COND WATERIN WATEROUT 
Temperature 
[°C] 
48.01 40.01 51.66 18.27 16.02 43.87 47.70 
Pressure 
[mbar] 
1004.49 2000 1065.06 2000 ~1000 ~1000 ~1000 
Total flow 
[kg/h] 
72 200.1 206.5 4.67 2.04 30.87 28.53 
Mass 
fractions 
       
MEA 0 0.275 0.265 0 0 0.0083 0.009 
H2O 0.071 0.673 0.661 0.004 1.0 0.9917 0.991 
CO2 0.085 0.052 0.074 0.996 0 0 0 
N2 0.743 0 0 0 0 0 0 
O2 0.101 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Molar CO2 
loading 
-- 0.262 0.387 -- -- -- -- 
 
The water makeup stream flowrate was determined using a standard balance block. The inlet 
stream was FLUEGAS and the water makeup stream, WATERMU, was introduced for the water 
balance. The outlet streams were GASOUT, CO2OUT and S7. The MEA makeup stream 
flowrate was determined using another standard balance block. The MEA makeup stream, 
MEAMU, was introduced for the MEA balance. The outlet streams were GASOUT, CO2OUT 
and S7. 
 
4.1.4.1 Simulation results 
A comparison of key simulation results with the measurements is given in the Table 4.6. It can 
also be demonstrated that these rate-based model correlations can reproduce quite accurately 
the experimentally measured temperature profiles in both the absorber and the stripper, the CO2 
weight fraction profiles in both columns, as well as the CO2 and water partial pressure profiles 
in both columns. 
Table 4.6. Key simulation results 
Variable Measurement Rate-based model 
CO2 loading of LEANIN [molCO2/molMEA] 0.262 0.262 
CO2 loading of RICHOUT [molCO2/molMEA] 0.387 0.384 
CO2 removal [%] 76.1 79.1 
Specific energy requirement of the reboiler excluding heat losses 
[MJ/kgCO2] 
5.01 5.25 
Makeup water [kg/h] 1.95 2.01 
Makeup MEA [kg/h] n/a 0.007 
Stripper reboiler heat duty excluding heat losses [kW] 6.47 7.05 
Heat recovery exchanger duty [kW] 13.52 12.39 
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4.2 Perturbation of FLUEGAS stream conditions 
In order to individuate the most critical part of the capture section, some changes in FLUEGAS 
operative conditions have been provided and the consequent alterations in the system have been 
observed. It is worth noting that a flue gas coming out of the stack is surely at a temperature 
not higher than 230°C and at a pressure approximately approaching the atmospheric one [66]. 
The capture process starts with an absorption step obviously to take off the CO2 from the other 
gases in the absorber, working at ~50°C and 1 atm, and continue with the desorption step in the 
stripper where MEA is regenerated and ready to be recycled back. In this work, it has been 
studied the system response to a higher flue gas temperature entering the absorber: it has been 
provided a continue increase of it, until 268°C has been reached. The results are presented in 
Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Stream results for the FLUEGAS at 265°C 
 
This FLUEGAS temperature is the maximum one permitting to obtain all the results without 
warnings and errors. The performance obviously worsens (more water and MEA are wasted 
and consequent need to increase their makeup) because absorption is optimized at temperature 
between 40 and 60°C, but the process still working perfectly. Obviously, this is an extreme 
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temperature for this type of plants, it can happen only, for example, in the case of an external 
fire and consequent irradiation of the stripper. If it will be tried to overcome that FLUEGAS 
temperature, warning messages will be found in the stripper block, as can be seen in Figure 4.6.  
 
Figure 4.6. Screenshot of the stripper block warning resulted in Aspen Plus after the attempt to overcome 268°C 
on FLUEGAS stream 
 
At this point material balances, precisely the charge balance, will not be respected anymore in 
the stripper section; moreover, this part of the process is the one operating at the highest 
temperature (usually between 100 and 140°C) and pressure (~2 bar). From these considerations, 
it can be stated that the stripper operation is the most hazardous one in the entire process, thus 
there is the need to perform a complete risk analysis. 
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Chapter 5 
Stripping section risk assessment  
In this chapter, a risk assessment will be done to evaluate the occurrence frequency of a release 
in the stripper section of a CCS plant. In order to achieve this task, the more common, useful 
and effective tools of the risk analysis will be employed: in particular, Hazop, fault tree and 
event tree analysis, respectively. To complete the study a release simulation on a hazard 
modeling program will be carried out. 
5.1 Hazop 
After the achievement and the examination of the results obtained by the simulation in Aspen 
Plus that have shown the “sore point” of the process, the risk analysis can start right there. The 
first step consists in the construction of the Hazop. This is a technique which allows the 
individuation of potential risks and operability issues by deviations from the project goals and 
linked, in particular, to malfunctions during the plant operation. This method has been applied 
at a simple P&ID of the section studied, that is represented in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1. P&ID of the stripping section of the capture process with MEA 
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The results of this procedure have been written in Table 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, as can be 
seen in the following, each one regarding a specific stream entering or existing the stripping 
column. 
Table 5.1. Hazop of the RICHIN stream 
Guide 
word 
Deviation Possible causes Consequences Proposed measures  
NO Flow 
Catastrophic 
rupture of HX2. 
Economic loss for serious 
plant damage. Release of 
toxic and/or flammable 
substances. Possible 
explosions. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. 
Advancement of an 
emergency plan. 
1 
Rupture of the 
pipe. 
Release of toxic and/or 
flammable substances. 
Possible explosions. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 1. Installation 
of both high pressure and 
low flowrate alarms. 
2 
Manual valve 
blocked in fully-
closed position. 
Increase of pressure in the 
pipe before the valve. 
Cooling of the stripper. 
Installation of a by-pass. 
Installation of both low 
pressure and low flow 
alarms after the valve. 
3 
MORE 
Flow 
Manual valve 
blocked in 
partially or fully-
open position. 
Stripper could achieve 
flooding conditions. Possible 
release of toxic and/or 
flammable substances. 
Installation of a control 
valve in series and of a 
large flow alarm. 
4 
Electrical or 
mechanical 
malfunctioning of 
the pump. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 4. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of an emergency 
generator that would start 
automatically. 
Installation of high 
flowrate alarm after the 
valve. 
5 
Richout flowrate 
larger than 
expected. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 4. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 4. Monitoring 
of Richout flowrate. 
6 
Pressure 
Manual valve 
blocked in 
partially or fully-
closed position. 
Pressure rises before the 
valve. Possible 
disconnection of the flange 
with release of toxic and/or 
flammable substances. 
Installation of control 
system and control valve 
in parallel. Installation of 
both low flow and high 
pressure alarms. 
7 
Temperature 
Malfunctioning of 
HX2 or of its 
control system. 
Too high steam 
pressure or steam 
flow. 
Possible evaporation of 
CO2. Possible formation of 
carbamate. 
Installation of high 
temperature and high 
pressure alarms on 
Richin stream. 
8 
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Richout stream 
hotter than 
expected. 
Analogous consequences of 
point 8. 
Installation of high 
temperature and high 
pressure alarms on both 
streams. 
9 
Irradiation from 
external fire. 
Possible evaporation of 
CO2. Possible formation of 
carbamate. Possible failure 
of the pipe. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 7. Installation 
of water curtain. 
10 
LESS 
Flow 
Manual valve 
blocked in 
partially-closed 
position. 
Analogous consequences of 
point 3. 
Analogous consequences 
of the point 7. 
11 
Electrical or 
mechanical 
malfunctioning of 
the pump. 
Possible cooling of the 
stripper with consequent 
performance decreased. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of an emergency 
generator that would start 
automatically. 
Installation of both low 
flowrate and low 
pressure alarms after the 
valve. 
12 
Rupture or loss 
from the pipe or 
flange loss. 
Release of toxic and/or 
flammable substances. 
Possible cooling of the 
stripper. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low pressure alarm. 
13 
Pressure 
Electrical or 
mechanical 
malfunctioning of 
the pump. 
Possible evaporation of 
CO2. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 12. 
14 
Rupture or loss 
from the pipe or 
flange loss. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 13. Possible 
evaporation of CO2. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 13. 
15 
Temperature 
Malfunctioning of 
HX2 or of its 
control system. 
Insufficient steam 
pressure or steam 
flow. 
Decreased stripper 
performance, if the reboiler 
control system does not 
work properly. 
Installation of both low 
temperature and low 
pressure alarms on 
Richin stream. 
16 
PART 
OF 
Composition 
Feed composition 
changes. 
Possible economic loss. 
Accurate monitoring and 
control of the feed. 
17 
Absorber 
performance 
drops. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 16. 
Accurate monitoring of 
the composition after the 
absorber to evaluate an 
eventual intervention. 
18 
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Table 5.2. Hazop of the LEANOUT stream 
Guide 
word 
Deviation Possible causes Consequences Proposed measures  
NO Flow 
Catastrophic 
rupture of the 
stripper. 
Economic loss for serious 
plant damage. Release of 
toxic and/or flammable 
substances. Possible 
explosions. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. 
Advancement of an 
emergency plan. 
1 
Control valve 
blocked in fully-
closed position. 
Stripper goes in flooding 
conditions. Release of toxic 
and/or flammable 
substances. Possible 
explosions. 
Installation of a by-pass. 
Installation of low 
pressure and low 
flowrate alarms after the 
control valve. 
2 
Wrong calibration 
of the level 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 2. 
Installation of valve and 
control system in 
parallel. 
3 
Rupture of the 
pipe. 
Release of toxic and/or 
flammable substances. 
Possible explosions. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 1. Installation 
of low pressure and low 
flowrate alarms. 
4 
MORE 
Flow 
Control valve 
blocked in 
partially open 
position. 
Stripper operation can be 
compromised. 
Addition of a manual 
valve in series. 
Installation of a high 
flowrate alarm. 
5 
Wrong calibration 
of the level 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 5. 
Installation of a valve 
and control system in 
parallel. 
6 
Excessive Richin 
flowrate. 
Maintaining the same 
composition, temperature 
and pressure drop in the 
stripper when the reboiler 
does not increase its duty. 
Careful monitoring of the 
process conditions. 
Installation of pressure 
and temperature 
indicators. 
7 
Pressure 
Control valve 
partially or fully-
closed. 
Possible flange 
disconnection and release of 
toxic and/or flammable 
substances. 
Installation of control 
system and control valve 
in parallel. Installation of 
low flowrate and high 
pressure alarms. 
8 
Wrong calibration 
of the level 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 8. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 8. 
9 
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or failure of the 
actuator. 
Temperature 
Increase of Richin 
temperature. 
Increase of temperature in 
the pipe, with possible 
collapse and consequent 
release. Possible formation 
of carbamate. 
Installation of safety 
valve and rupture disc. 
Careful monitoring of the 
process conditions. 
Addition of temperature 
indicators. 
10 
Irradiation from 
external fire. 
Possible formation of 
carbamate. Possible collapse 
of the pipe with consequent 
release. 
Installation of water 
curtain. 
11 
Malfunctioning of 
the reboiler. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 10. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 10. 
12 
LESS 
Flow 
Insufficient 
Richin flowrate. 
Maintaining the same 
composition, temperature 
and pressure decrease in the 
stripper. 
Careful monitoring of the 
process conditions. 
Addition of pressure and 
temperature alarms and 
indicators. Monitoring of 
Richin flowrate. 
13 
Rupture or loss 
from the pipe, 
loss from the 
flange. 
Release of toxic and/or 
flammable substances. 
Economic loss for decreased 
absorption capacity for the 
recycled stream. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low flowrate alarm. 
14 
Control valve 
blocked in 
partially-closed 
position. 
Economic loss for decreased 
absorption capacity for the 
recycled stream. 
Installation of control 
system and control valve 
in parallel. Installation of 
low flow and high 
pressure alarms. 
15 
Wrong calibration 
of the level 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 15. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 15. 
16 
Pressure 
Wrong calibration 
of the level 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Possible increase of 
temperature and pressure in 
the stripper, if the reboiler 
control system does not 
work properly. 
Addition of a control 
valve in series. 
Installation of a low 
pressure alarm. 
17 
Rupture or loss 
from the pipe, 
loss from the 
flange. 
Release of toxic and/or 
flammable substances. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low pressure alarm. 
18 
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Temperature 
Richin at lower 
temperature than 
expected. 
Decreased stripper 
performance. 
Addition of temperature 
indicators and alarms. 
Monitoring of the feed 
conditions. 
19 
Reboiler steam at 
lower pressure, 
lower flowrate or 
lower 
temperature. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 19. 
Addition of temperature, 
pressure and flowrate 
indicators and alarms for 
the steam. 
20 
PART 
OF 
Composition 
Decreased 
stripper 
performance, 
more CO2 and 
less MEA in this 
stream. 
Economic loss for less CO2 
separated and worse 
composition quality for 
Leanout that is going to the 
absorber. 
Accurate monitoring of 
the Leanout stream 
composition to evaluate 
an eventual intervention. 
21 
Richin 
composition 
changed. 
Possible formation of 
flammable mixtures and 
possible economical loss. 
Accurate monitoring and 
control of the Richin 
stream. 
22 
 
Table 5.3. Hazop of the CO2OUT stream 
Guide 
word 
Deviation Possible causes Consequences Proposed measures  
NO Flow 
Catastrophic 
rupture of the 
stripper. 
Economic loss for serious 
plant damage. Release of 
toxic and/or flammable 
substances. Possible 
explosions. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. 
Advancement of an 
emergency plan. 
1 
Control valve 
blocked in fully-
closed position. 
Pressure rises in the stripper, 
with possible collapse of the 
equipment and release. 
Installation of safety 
valve and rupture disc. 
Accurate monitoring of 
pressure drops and 
installation of gauge and 
pressure alarm. 
2 
Wrong calibration 
of the flow or 
temperature 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 2. 
Installation of valve and 
control system in 
parallel. 
3 
Rupture of the 
pipe. 
Release of CO2. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Arrest of 
the feeding. Installation 
of low pressure and low 
flowrate alarms. 
4 
MORE Flow 
Wrong calibration 
of the flow or 
Increased pressure and flow 
in the pipe, with possible 
Installation of a safety 
valve and a rupture disc. 
5 
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temperature 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
collapse and consequent 
release. 
Careful monitoring of the 
process conditions. 
Addition of pressure 
indicators. 
Control valve 
blocked in 
partially open 
position. 
Stripper pressure decreases. 
Addition of a control 
valve in series. 
Installation of a high 
flowrate alarm. 
6 
Excessive 
pressure of the 
CO2 coming from 
the condenser and 
consequent 
inability of 
flowrate control 
from the valve. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 5. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 5. 
7 
Malfunctioning of 
the stripper 
(reboiler is 
heating more than 
necessary). 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 5. Possible 
formation of carbamate. 
Possible MEA evaporation. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 5. 
8 
Excessive Richin 
flowrate and/or 
temperature. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 5. Possible 
formation of carbamate. 
Possible MEA evaporation. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 5. 
9 
Pressure 
Control valve 
partially or fully-
closed. 
Possible condensation of 
CO2. Possible disconnection 
of the flange with release of 
CO2. 
Installation of the control 
system and control valve 
in parallel. Installation of 
low flowrate and high 
pressure alarms. 
10 
Excessive Richin 
flowrate and/or 
temperature. 
Increase of stripper and 
pipes pressure, with possible 
collapse of the equipment 
and consequent release. 
Possible formation of 
carbamate. 
Installation of safety 
valve and rupture disc. 
Careful monitoring of 
process conditions. 
Addition of pressure and 
temperature indicators. 
11 
Wrong calibration 
of the flow or 
temperature 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 10. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 10. 
12 
Irradiation from 
external fire. 
Possible collapse of the 
pipes with release of CO2. 
Possible formation of 
carbamate. 
Installation of water 
curtains and temperature 
and pressure alarms. 
13 
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Malfunctioning of 
the stripper 
(reboiler is 
heating more than 
necessary). 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 8. Possible 
formation of carbamate. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 8. 
14 
Temperature 
Excessive Richin 
temperature. 
Increased temperature and 
pressure in the pipe with 
possible collapse and 
consequent release. Possible 
formation of carbamate. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 5. 
15 
Malfunctioning of 
the stripper 
(reboiler is 
heating more than 
necessary and/or 
condenser is 
cooling less than 
necessary). 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 15. Possible 
formation of carbamate. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 5. 
16 
Irradiation from 
external fire. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 13. Possible 
formation of 
carbamate. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 13. 
17 
LESS Flow 
Control valve 
blocked in 
partially closed 
position. 
Economic loss due to less 
CO2 separated. Stripper 
pressure increases. 
Installation of control 
system and control valve 
in parallel. Installation of 
low flowrate and high 
pressure alarms. 
18 
Wrong calibration 
of the flow or 
temperature 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 18. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 18. 
19 
Rupture or loss of 
the pipe, flange 
loss. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 18. Possible release 
of CO2. 
Frequent maintenance 
and inspections. 
Installation of a low 
pressure alarm. 
20 
Insufficient 
pressure of CO2 
coming from the 
condenser. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 18. It is possible 
that some CO2 comes back. 
Addition of a check 
valve after the control 
valve. Addition of a low 
pressure alarm. 
21 
Insufficient 
Richin flowrate. 
Maintaining the same 
composition, temperature 
and pressure decrease in the 
stripper. Economic loss due 
to less CO2 separated. 
Careful monitoring of the 
process conditions. 
Addition of low flowrate 
and pressure indicators 
and alarms. Monitoring 
of Richin flowrate. 
22 
Stripping section risk assessment                                                                                                                                75 
 
Temperature 
lower than 
expected. 
Volume contraction for the 
CO2out stream. Economic 
loss due to low pressure that 
afterwards will need to be 
increased. 
Addition of pressure and 
temperature indicators 
and alarms. Frequent 
inspections and 
maintenance of the 
cooling equipment. 
23 
Pressure 
Wrong calibration 
of the flow or 
temperature 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Economic loss due to low 
pressure that afterwards will 
need to be increased. 
Addition of a control 
valve in series. 
Installation of a low 
pressure alarm. 
24 
Rupture or loss of 
the pipe, flange 
loss. 
Economic loss for the 
release of CO2. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low pressure alarm. 
25 
Insufficient 
stripper pressure. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 24. 
Addition of low pressure 
alarm. 
26 
Temperature 
lower than 
expected. 
Volume contraction of 
CO2out stream. Analogous 
consequences of the point 
24. 
Addition of pressure and 
temperature indicators 
and alarms. Frequent 
inspections and 
maintenance of the 
condenser. 
27 
Temperature 
Excessive cooling 
of the condenser. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 27. 
. Analogous measures of 
the point 23. Automatic 
control of the cooling 
water flowrate. 
28 
Temperature drop 
in the stripper 
(insufficient heat 
from the reboiler 
and/or cold 
Richin stream). 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 27. 
Addition of pressure and 
temperature indicators 
and alarms. Monitoring 
of the stripper feeding. 
29 
PART 
OF 
Composition 
Decreased 
performance of 
the stripper (more 
water and MEA 
and less CO2 in 
CO2out stream). 
Economic loss for reduced 
CO2 content. 
Accurate monitoring of 
the CO2out stream 
composition to evaluate 
an eventual intervention. 
30 
Richin 
composition 
changed. 
Possible formation of 
flammable mixtures and 
possible economical loss. 
Accurate monitoring and 
control of the Richin 
stream. 
31 
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Table 5.4. Hazop of the COND stream 
Guide 
word 
Deviation Possible causes Consequences Proposed measures  
NO Flow 
Catastrophic 
rupture of the 
stripper. 
Economic loss for serious 
plant damage. Release of 
toxic and/or flammable 
substances. Possible 
explosions. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. 
Advancement of an 
emergency plan. 
1 
Rupture of the 
pipe. 
Release of water. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low pressure and low 
flowrate alarms. 
2 
MORE 
Flow 
Manual valve 
blocked in fully-
open position. 
Reflux flowrate decreases 
until it reaches zero, thus 
tripper performance 
worsens. 
Installation of a control 
valve in series and of a 
large flow alarm. 
3 
Pressure 
Manual valve 
partially or fully-
closed. 
Possible flange 
disconnection with release 
of water. 
Installation of control 
system and control valve 
in parallel. Installation of 
low flowrate and high 
pressure alarms. 
4 
Irradiation from 
external fire. 
Possible collapse of pipes 
with release of water. 
Possible formation of 
carbamate. 
Installation of water 
curtains. Installation of 
high pressure and 
temperature alarms. 
5 
Temperature 
Excessive Richin 
temperature. 
No consequences if excess is 
limited. Possible evaporation 
of MEA, thus Cond changes 
its composition. Possible 
formation of carbamate. 
Addition of high 
temperature alarm. 
Monitoring of Cond 
composition. 
6 
Malfunctioning of 
the stripper 
(reboiler is 
heating more than 
necessary and/or 
condenser is 
cooling less than 
necessary). 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 6. 
Installation of high 
temperature and high 
pressure alarms on Cond 
stream. 
7 
Irradiation from 
external fire. 
Possible collapse of pipes. 
Possible MEA evaporation 
ad formation of carbamate. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 5. 
8 
LESS Flow 
Manual valve 
blocked in 
partially-closed 
position. 
Increased reflux flowrate, 
thus increased heat duty. 
Installation of control 
system and control valve 
in parallel. Installation of 
low flowrate and high 
pressure alarms. 
9 
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Rupture or loss of 
the pipe, flange 
loss. 
Loss of water from the pipe. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low flowrate and low 
pressure alarms. 
10 
Insufficient 
Richin flowrate. 
Maintaining the same 
composition, temperature 
and pressure decrease in the 
stripper. Reflux flowrate, as 
well as Cond flowrate, 
decreases, thus stripper 
performance worsens. 
Careful monitoring of the 
process conditions. 
Addition of pressure and 
flowrate indicators and 
alarms. Monitoring of 
Richin flowrate. 
11 
Stripper 
temperature lower 
than expected (ex. 
Reboiler is 
heating less than 
wanted). 
Reflux flowrate decreases 
thus stripper performance 
worsen. 
Addition of pressure and 
temperature indicators 
and alarms. Monitoring 
of steam conditions. 
12 
Pressure 
Rupture or loss of 
the pipe, flange 
loss. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 10. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 10. 
13 
Temperature 
Condenser is 
cooling more than 
necessary. 
No consequences if cooling 
is not excessive. 
Installation of low 
temperature alarms on 
Cond stream. Installation 
of temperature indicators 
in condenser utility 
stream. 
14 
PART 
OF 
Composition 
Temperature 
higher than 
expected. 
Possible increased presence 
of MEA. Possible formation 
of carbamate. 
Accurate control and 
monitoring of the stream 
composition. 
15 
 
 
Table 5.5. Hazop of the Reboiler steam stream 
Guide 
word 
Deviation Possible causes Consequences Proposed measures  
NO Flow 
Control valve 
blocked in closed 
position. 
Stripper stops working. 
Arrest of the feeding. 
Installation of a by-pass. 
Installation of low 
pressure and low 
flowrate alarms after the 
control valve. 
1 
Rupture of the 
pipe. 
Release of hot steam. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low pressure and low 
flowrate alarms. 
2 
Wrong calibration 
of the flow sensor, 
failure of the 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 1. 
Installation of valve and 
control system in 
parallel. 
3 
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control circuit or 
failure of the 
actuator. 
Absence of steam 
generation 
upstream. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 1. 
Addition of low flowrate 
and low pressure alarms 
upstream the control 
valve, and eventually 
plant shutdown. 
4 
MORE 
Flow 
Control valve 
blocked in 
partially or fully-
open position. 
Stripper temperature and 
pressure increase with 
possible formation of 
carbamate. Possible 
evaporation of MEA. 
Addition of a manual 
valve in series. 
Installation of a high 
flowrate alarm. 
5 
Wrong calibration 
of the flow sensor, 
failure of the 
control circuit or 
failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 5. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 5. 
6 
Excessive steam 
pressure and 
consequent 
inability to 
control flowrate 
through the valve. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 5. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 5. Addition of 
high pressure and 
flowrate alarms. 
7 
Pressure 
Control valve 
blocked in 
partially closed 
position. 
Possible corruption of the 
control valve. Possible 
increase of stripper 
temperature and pressure. 
Possible disconnection of 
the flanges. Possible steam 
condensation. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 5. Installation 
of high pressure alarm. 
8 
Wrong calibration 
of the flow sensor, 
failure of the 
control circuit or 
failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 8. 
Installation of control 
system and control valve 
in parallel. Installation of 
high pressure alarm. 
9 
Temperature 
Increase of 
temperature 
upstream. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 5. 
Addition of high steam 
pressure alarm. 
10 
Irradiation from 
external fire. 
Possible increase of stripper 
temperature. Possible 
formation of carbamate. 
Possible evaporation of 
MEA. Possible failure of the 
pipes. 
Addition of high steam 
temperature alarm. 
Installation of water 
curtains. 
11 
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LESS 
Flow 
Control valve 
blocked in 
partially closed 
position. 
Stripper temperature 
decreases, thus performance 
decreases. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 9. Installation 
of low flowrate alarm. 
12 
Wrong calibration 
of the flow sensor, 
failure of the 
control circuit or 
failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 12. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 12. 
13 
Insufficient 
incoming steam 
pressure. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 12. 
Addition of low flowrate 
and low pressure alarms. 
14 
Rupture or loss of 
the pipe. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 12. Possible release 
of a hot steam jet. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of a flowrate alarm and 
plant shutdown in case of 
serious lack of steam. 
Installation of low 
pressure alarm. 
 
15 
Pressure 
Insufficient 
incoming steam 
pressure. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 12. 
Addition of a low 
pressure alarm. 
16 
Wrong calibration 
of the flow sensor, 
failure of the 
control circuit or 
failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 12. 
Installation of a low 
pressure and plant 
shutdown in case of 
serious lack of steam. 
17 
Rupture or loss of 
the pipe. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 15. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low pressure alarm 
and eventual plant 
shutdown in case of 
serious lack of steam. 
 
18 
Temperature 
Insufficient 
incoming steam 
temperature. 
Possible stripper temperature 
diminution. Possible steam 
condensation. 
Addition of a 
temperature alarm and 
eventual plant shutdown. 
19 
PART 
OF 
Composition 
Improper pre-
treatment of water 
upstream. 
Possible equipment 
corrosion. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. 
20 
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Table 5.6. Hazop of the Reflux stream 
Guide 
word 
Deviation Possible causes Consequences Proposed measures  
NO Flow 
Control valve 
blocked in closed 
position. 
Stripper stops working. 
Arrest of the feeding. 
Installation of a by-pass. 
Installation of low 
pressure and low 
flowrate alarms after the 
control valve. 
1 
Rupture of the 
pipe. 
Release of water. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low pressure and low 
flowrate alarms. 
2 
Wrong calibration 
of the level 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 1. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 1. 
3 
Catastrophic 
rupture of the 
stripper. 
Economic loss for serious 
plant damage. Release of 
toxic and/or flammable 
substances. Possible 
explosions. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. 
Advancement of an 
emergency plan. 
4 
MORE 
Flow 
Control valve 
blocked in 
partially open 
position. 
Stripper performance 
increased, but more heat 
duty needed. 
Addition of a control 
valve in series. 
Installation of high 
flowrate alarm. 
5 
Wrong calibration 
of the level 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 5. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 5. 
6 
Excessive Richin 
flowrate. 
Maintaining the same 
composition, temperature 
and pressure drop in the 
stripper when the reboiler 
does not increase its duty. 
Careful monitoring of the 
process conditions. 
Installation of pressure 
and temperature 
indicators. 
7 
Pressure 
Control valve 
partially or fully-
closed. 
Possible flange 
disconnection and release of 
water. 
Installation of control 
system and control valve 
in parallel. Installation of 
low flowrate and high 
pressure alarms. 
8 
Wrong calibration 
of the level 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 8. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 8. 
9 
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or failure of the 
actuator. 
Temperature 
Excessive Richin 
temperature. 
Possible water evaporation 
with consequent pressure 
increase. Possible formation 
of carbamate. 
Installation of high 
temperature alarm in the 
Richin stream. Addition 
of high pressure alarm. 
10 
Irradiation from 
external fire. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 10. Possible 
collapse of the equipment. 
Installation of water 
curtain. Addition of high 
pressure and temperature 
indicators and alarms. 
11 
Malfunctioning of 
the condenser. 
Possible water evaporation 
with consequent pressure 
increase. 
Installation of control 
system and control valve 
in the condenser. 
12 
LESS 
Flow 
Insufficent Richin 
flowrate. 
Maintaining the same 
composition, temperature 
and pressure decrease in the 
stripper. Decreased 
separation efficiency. 
Careful monitoring of the 
process conditions. 
Addition of pressure and 
temperature alarms and 
indicators. Monitoring of 
Richin flowrate. 
13 
Rupture or loss 
from the pipe, 
loss from the 
flange. 
Release of water. Decreased 
stripper performance. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low flowrate alarm. 
14 
Control valve 
blocked in 
partially-closed 
position. 
Decreased stripper 
performance. 
Installation of control 
system and control valve 
in parallel. Installation of 
low flow and high 
pressure alarms. 
15 
Wrong calibration 
of the level 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
Analogous consequences of 
the point 15. 
Analogous measures of 
the point 15. 
16 
Pressure 
Wrong calibration 
of the level 
sensor, failure of 
the control circuit 
or failure of the 
actuator. 
No consequences if 
diminution is not large. 
Addition of a control 
valve in series. 
Installation of a low 
pressure alarm. 
17 
Rupture or loss 
from the pipe, 
loss from the 
flange. 
Release of water. Decreased 
stripper performance. 
Frequent inspections and 
maintenance. Installation 
of low pressure alarm. 
18 
Temperature 
Condenser is 
cooling more than 
expected. 
Possible water solidification. 
Decreased stripper 
temperature and consequent 
performance diminution. 
Addition of temperature 
indicators and alarms. 
Monitoring of reflux 
temperature. 
19 
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Lower stripper 
temperature. 
Possible water solidification. 
Addition of temperature, 
pressure and flowrate 
indicators and alarms. 
20 
PART 
OF 
Composition 
Higher stripper 
temperature. 
Possible evaporation of 
MEA and consequent 
increased presence in the 
reflux. 
Accurate monitoring of 
reflux composition. 
21 
5.2 Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis 
Although the Hazop was performed in a very accurate way, it is still a qualitative method. Now 
it is time to applicate a technique which can give a quantitative evaluation of the occurrence 
frequency: this is the FTA. It starts from a Top event, which in this case is a release from the 
stripping column, that obviously can come from a lot of different causes linked to stream 
conditions, equipment malfunctioning, control systems failures, etc. The resulted FTA, which, 
for space reasons, will be shown divided into Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 in the following pages, 
is based on the simple P&ID presented in the previous paragraph, precisely in the Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.2. Part A of FTA of a MEA release from a stripping column 
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Figure 5.3. Part B of FTA of a MEA release from a stripping column 
 
As can be seen in the figures, the resulted occurrence frequency of a release, for the piece of 
equipment represented in the P&ID, is really high, precisely about 4.1*10-5 events/hour: this 
means 0.36 events/year, that is evidently not acceptable. Thus, the FTA needs some corrections 
to reach a more reasonable frequency. For this purpose, the Hazop analysis is absolutely helpful: 
by watching at it, the proposed measures to contrast the system alterations, e.g., installation of 
valves and alarms, can be inserted in the FTA and, consequently, the number of events per year 
will decrease of some orders of magnitude. The FTA with the modifications are represented in 
the Figure 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7: for space reasons, they are in the following pages. 
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Figure 5.4. Part 1 of modified FTA of a MEA release from a stripping column 
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Figure 5.5. Part 2 of modified FTA of a MEA release from a stripping column 
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Figure 5.6. Part 3 of modified FTA of a MEA release from a stripping column 
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Figure 5.7. Part 4 of modified FTA of a MEA release from a stripping column 
 
As can be seen from the previous figures, the occurrence frequency of the release is decreased 
a lot from the precedent case: it results 1.75*10-8 events/hours that are equivalent of 1.53*10-4 
events/year. A really significant reduction happened, thanks to the improvements inserted: the 
frequency is more than 2000 times lower than before. The next step, after the occurrence 
frequency evaluation of the release, is the construction of the ETA in order to individuate all 
the possible scenarios that can originate. This is displayed in the Figure 5.8 in the following 
page. 
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Figure 5.8. ETA of a MEA release from a stripping column 
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5.3 Aloha® simulation of the consequences 
Subsequently to the achievement of FTA and ETA reports, it has been run a simulation on a 
hazard modeling software, which can give details about releases and it generates threat zone 
estimates for various type of hazards. The simulation details are summarized in the Figure 5.9. 
The location chosen for the release is the University of Kaiserslautern (Germany), where the 
pilot plant actually is. The atmospheric data have been set as mean local conditions. 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Site data, Chemical data and Atmospheric data loaded in Aloha to start the simulation 
 
The study of the consequences is structured in this way: three different temperatures and three 
different hole sizes are chosen at which the release exhibits. In particular, the temperatures are:  
• 120 °C: usually the best practice temperature for the stripping section; 
• 268 °C: the maximum temperature to which the Aspen Plus simulation reached the 
convergence without warnings in the material balances; 
• 190 °C: an intermediate value between the previous ones. 
The hole diameters instead are taken from the Standard API 581: 
• Small: 0.25 in; 
• Medium: 1 in; 
• Large: 4 in. 
Other simulation conditions that have to be specified: 
• Every hole is considered on the stripper bottom; 
• The MEA amount in the stripper is imposed to be 30 kg, as it is found to be during the 
process simulation in Aspen Plus; 
• The opening on the wall is supposed to be circular; 
• The ground temperature is supposed to be equal to the air temperature. 
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It has to be recognized also that there is a limit in this simulation: it has been used the same 
MEA mass contained in the stripper, but it does not take into account that there is not pure MEA 
but, in the pilot plant, is present a solution of about 30%. 
5.3.1 Release temperature of 120°C 
5.3.1.1 Case 1a: 120 °C, 0.25 in 
Results are displayed in Figure 5.10. 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Release simulation results of case 1a (120 °C, 0.25 in) in Aloha 
 
At this temperature, the MEA is liquid. Aloha displayed a message saying that “Threat zone 
was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable 
for short distances”: in this case, Aloha was not able to provide a reliable result because the 
release was really scarce (the total amount released was only about 197 g at a flowrate of almost 
4 g/min). 
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5.3.1.2 Case 1b: 120 °C, 1 in 
Results are displayed in Figure 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.11. Release simulation results of case 1b (120 °C, 1 in) in Aloha 
 
Results are analogous of the previous one. Also this time Aloha was not able to provide a 
reliable result because the release was really small (the total amount released was only about 
245 g at a flowrate of almost 50 g/min). 
 
5.3.1.3 Case 1c: 120 °C, 4 in 
Results are displayed in Figure 5.12. 
 
Figure 5.12. Release simulation results of case 1c (120 °C, 4 in) in Aloha 
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Results are analogous of the previous one. Also this time Aloha was not able to provide a 
reliable result because the release was really small (the total amount released was only about 
330 g at a flowrate of almost 154 g/min). 
5.3.2 Release temperature of 190°C 
5.3.2.1 Case 2a: 190 °C, 0.25 in 
Results are displayed in Figure 5.13. 
 
Figure 5.13. Plot of release simulation of case 2a (190 °C, 0.25 in) in Aloha 
 
All the MEA contained in the stripper has been released at a flowrate of 14.8 kg/min. It can be 
seen from the plot that a plume of gaseous MEA is forming: in fact, in this case the release 
temperature is a bit higher than the MEA boiling temperature (168.8°C).  
 
5.3.2.2 Case 2b: 190 °C, 1 in 
Results are displayed in Figure 5.14. 
 
Figure 5.14. Plot of release simulation of case 2b (190 °C, 1 in) in Aloha 
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Results are analogous of the previous one: obviously, the release flowrate and the area involved 
are bigger and consequent health risks too (appearance of the red zone in the plot). 
 
5.3.2.3 Case 2c: 190 °C, 4 in 
Results are displayed in Figure 5.15. 
 
Figure 5.15. Plot of release simulation of case 2c (190 °C, 4 in) in Aloha 
 
Results seem to be perfectly identical of the previous case: probably the system have reached a 
sort of asymptote in terms of release flowrate. 
5.3.3 Release temperature of 268°C 
5.3.3.1 Case 3a: 268 °C, 0.25 in 
Results are displayed in Figure 5.16. 
 
Figure 5.16. Plot of release simulation of case 3a (268 °C, 0.25 in) in Aloha 
Results are analogous of the previous one: obviously, the release flowrate and the area involved 
are bigger and consequent health risks too thanks to the higher temperature. 
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5.3.3.2 Case 3b: 268 °C, 1 in 
Results are displayed in Figure 5.17. 
Figure 5.17. Plot of release simulation of case 3b (268 °C, 1 in) in Aloha 
 
Results seem to be perfectly identical of the previous case: probably the system have reached a 
sort of asymptote in terms of release flowrate. 
 
5.3.3.3 Case 3c: 268 °C, 4 in 
Results are displayed in Figure 5.18. 
 
Figure 5.18. Plot of release simulation of case 3c (268 °C, 4 in) in Aloha 
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Results seem to be perfectly identical of the previous case: probably the system have reached a 
sort of asymptote in terms of release flowrate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Conclusions 
 
In this century, the attention for the environment is becoming always more and more effective. 
There are a lot of ways to reduce the CO2 emissions in the atmosphere, in order to try to reduce 
the greenhouse effects. In this work, the focus has been on the Carbon Capture and Storage 
technology, in particular on the capture section: the goal was to support the advancement of the 
known best practices in this field.  
 
Initially a historical analysis of the industrial accidents regarding the substances that can be 
used in the capture section of a CCS plant has been done, with the result that the manipulation 
of monoethanolamine, one of the solvents between the chemical absorption processes, is 
probable more critical than other capture process.  
 
Afterwards, an Aspen Plus simulation on a pilot plant operating a carbon capture process with 
MEA, permitted the identification of the main critical part of the plant that has been verified to 
be the stripping column. That has been obtained by running several simulations with a 
continuous increase in the flue gas temperature, until 268°C has been reached: this value is 
important because issues arose in the material balances, in particular the charge balance has not 
been respected anymore up from this point, right in the stripper.  
 
After these considerations, a risk analysis, which has been performed in this thesis, has brought 
a lot of different improvements, in particular through the Hazop. From this technique resulted 
that there was the need of a lot of improvements, like the installation of pressure, flowrate and 
temperature alarms, manual valves, control systems, emergency generators, addition of by-pass 
streams, writing an emergency plan and the prediction of an emergency shut down of the plant. 
This was the list of all the countermeasures the pilot plant needed to overcome all possible 
malfunctioning, equipment failures and, in general, process alterations from the ordinary 
operations, with the aim of reduce the occurrence frequency of a MEA release; that has been 
verified with the help of the Fault Tree Analysis done before and after that the modifications 
have been carried out. This brought to a reduction of more than 2000 times of the frequency of 
the MEA release: precisely the first FTA had a frequency of 0.36 events/year and the modified 
one reached 1.53*10-4 events/year. It is also strongly suggested to carry out the risk analysis in 
parallel with the process design because there is not so much experience with this technology, 
so the predictive part is extremely important and have to be really accurate. 
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To conclude this thesis, it has been performed a simulation with Aloha, a hazard modeling 
program, to graphically represent a MEA release between different conditions both in terms of 
temperature and in terms of hole diameters in the stripper. It resulted that by increasing the 
temperature and the hole size the seriousness of the release is intensified, with an enlarged 
spread of the substance. 
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